

POPULATION DIVERSITY AND THE U.S. ARMY



Lloyd J. Matthews
Editor

and


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FOREWORD

At times, an institution needs to examine itself and take stock of its future. The "Army" writ large as an institution is, above all, an assembly of people—all with a common bond and task. This book deals with the vital question of how the United States armed forces in general, and the Army as an institution in particular, can best accommodate in their recruiting efforts the rapid changes in U.S. population patterns over the next half century. It is an effort at self-examination. The book is an outgrowth of convergent initiatives on the part of two American educational institutions—the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, and Spelman College in Atlanta, Georgia—the two having formed a fruitful partnership to co-sponsor a conference titled "Population Diversity and the U.S. Army in 2030," held at Spelman College on August 7, 1998.

The Army War College, through its Strategic Outreach Program, makes a concerted effort to connect with various American civilian entities not only to promote mutual understanding, but also to find collaborative solutions for military problems that ultimately affect all Americans. Spelman College, positioned at the core of the network of historically black colleges in Atlanta and having a student body of black women, provided an ideal venue for examining issues regarding demographic and ethnic change that we expect in America over the next several decades. We should acknowledge as well the yeoman assistance of the U.S. Army Recruiting Command located at Fort Knox, Kentucky, which provided to conferees useful briefings wholly devoid of academic vapors, focusing rather upon the unvarnished realities of future projections of the composition of America's population. Our Recruiting Command colleagues also discussed in clear terms the Army's efforts to enlist women and members of other diverse groups in the recruiting market of today—and what we can expect tomorrow.

This book is not intended as a transcript of all conference proceedings. Rather, it is an anthology of selected presentations that not only portrays the main challenges confronting those who must staff the future force in the face of unprecedented demographic flux, but also provides the attitudes and hopes of women and minorities who are part of today's Army.

The reader should pay particular attention to Chapter 2, which examines the Russian military. Its author, Robert Pringle, gives us a case study in what happens when an institution collapses because it can not accommodate diversity and change.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Larry M. Wortzel". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large, sweeping initial "L".

LARRY M. WORTZEL
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION: PRIMER ON FUTURE RECRUIT DIVERSITY

Lloyd J. Matthews

If we do not learn from history, we shall be compelled to relive it. True. But if we do not change the future, we shall be compelled to endure it. And that could be worse.

Alvin Toffler¹

The premises of this monograph are that an epoch-defining demographic ferment is in progress in the United States today, that this ferment will produce fundamental changes in the composition of the Army, and that the Army must adapt to such changes with great wisdom if the emotion-laden issues evoked at every turn are not to stymie the muster of an optimum ground force over the next several decades.

Evidence of demographic flux is everywhere, in popular literature as well as the Census Bureau's official projections. Consider, for example, the eye-popping projection that Americans of European background, now comprising about 72 percent of the U.S. population, will diminish to about 53 percent by the year 2050, meaning that so-called "white Anglo-Saxons" are headed for minority status. The fastest-growing ethnic group is those of Hispanic origin, who if current trends hold will comprise one-quarter of the population by mid-century.² Though Nation of Islam leader Louis Farrakhan once avowed that "with our increased birthrates the black man and woman can actually breed ourselves into power,"³ the likelihood rather is that as early as the year 2008, Hispanics, now numbering 30.5 million, will have eclipsed blacks and form

the largest minority in the country. Writer Tad Szulc makes an even stronger claim:

Hispanics *already* constitute the largest single ethnic and cultural minority in the U.S., contrary to Census Bureau figures, which do not include more than 4 million Hispanics living here illegally, as well as the nearly 4 million Puerto Ricans on their island. This puts their numbers above those of African-Americans. With 600,000 new immigrants a year—about half of them illegal—Hispanics will reach 50 million [by 2005].⁴

Another American ethnic group experiencing a rapid increase in its numbers is the Asian and Pacific Islander populations, now constituting less than four percent of U.S. citizens but expected to reach 8.2 percent by mid-century. Blacks, currently numbering about 12.2 percent, are projected to remain relatively steady at 13.6 percent over that same period.

But ethnicity and race are not the only population variables that can bear on the composition of an army—gender, sexual orientation, and religion, to name a few others that spring most prominently to mind—are obviously relevant.⁵ Women are knocking at the door of the armed forces in growing numbers. Females slightly outnumber males in the U.S. population, and they are gradually exercising ballot clout and employment options more proportionate to their numbers. As an example, January 1999 saw the swearing in of the top five elected state officials in Arizona who were all women! Meanwhile, Elizabeth Dole ponders a run for the Republican presidential nomination.

Homosexuals are also demanding access to military careers, and while their relative numbers may not be increasing their militance is. The current “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy—a middle path between outright rejection of homosexuals on one hand, and total acceptance on the other—was ruled constitutional by the 2d U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in New York on September 23, 1998.⁶

Further, at the time of publication of this monograph, homosexuals were not classified as a minority group deserving of special civil rights protection. But no knowledgeable observer expects this to be the last gavel sounded on the issue.

Meanwhile, a survey among soldiers conducted by Charles Moskos and Laura Miller suggested that internal resistance to homosexuals in the military may be softening. Of 270 male soldiers surveyed, only 36 percent were "strongly opposed," with 22 percent "not sure." Women favored accepting homosexuals by better than two to one.⁷ The survey samples were smallish and not selected scientifically, but if the numbers hold up they could be important since one of the arguments against homosexuals in the military rests on the assumption that they would be rejected by heterosexual comrades in the ranks, jeopardizing unit cohesion.

On the religious front, the number of faiths represented among service members has grown well beyond the traditional "Big Three"—Protestant, Catholic, Jewish.⁸ The Buddhist Churches of America became the first non-Judeo-Christian chaplaincy endorsing agency in 1987.⁹ By 1989, more than 100 religious denominations were represented among active duty Army chaplains.¹⁰ In 1992, Chaplain Abdul R. Muhammad became the first Islamic chaplain on active duty, and we are now seeing the establishment of "mosques" on some Army posts, e.g., Fort Bragg, North Carolina, where Muslim soldiers can worship in appropriate facilities.¹¹ By 1994, there were 1,400 Muslims and 1,240 Buddhists in the Total Army, numbers that showed every promise of growing.¹²

The upshot of the foregoing discussion is that as the tectonic plates comprising the U.S. population continue to shift, there will be inevitable reflections of these changes in the Army's composition. To acquire richer diversity in human capital can bring with it enormous advantages for any country or institution, as the American immigrant

experience in the 19th and early-20th centuries so clearly demonstrated. But the *process* of acquiring that diversity can be unsettling at best and explosively controversial at worst. This is why intelligent planning and wise management become so critical for the Army during its encounter with growing recruit diversity over the next several decades. We can glimpse the nature of the problem by reference to several examples.

In the best of all possible worlds, ethnic representation within the Army should reflect at least roughly the ethnic proportions of the general population. When these proportions are seriously out of whack or are perceived to be so, particularly in combat units during wartime, the “cannon-fodder” allegation inevitably arises. Complaints were registered during both the Vietnam and Persian Gulf wars that poor blacks bore a disproportionate share of the combat risks. African-American leaders Jesse Jackson and Benjamin Hooks, for example, protested that U.S. Army forces sent to the Gulf were 30 percent black, whereas the U.S. population was only 11 percent black. After the Gulf War, Professor Ronald Walters of the Howard University faculty recommended binding quotas limiting blacks in the military to their proportion of the population at large.¹³

In fact, however, as Charles Moskos and John Sibley Butler have pointed out, in the Vietnam War black fatalities came to only 12.1 percent of the total for all Americans, a percentage corresponding almost exactly to the percentage of blacks in the general population and far below the percentage of blacks in the military at that time. Going further, Moskos and Butler collected data on combat deaths by race in seven U.S. overseas interventions since Vietnam—Mayaguez (Cambodia), Lebanon, Grenada, Panama, the Persian Gulf, Somalia, and Bosnia. Blacks accounted for only 14 percent of the U.S. combat fatalities. Moskos and Butler conclude: “No serious case can be made that African-Americans suffer disproportionate casualties in America’s wars and interventions.”¹⁴

The Army cannot afford to be complacent over the foregoing analysis, however, since the subject of comparative ethnic shares of combat risk remains so extraordinarily sensitive—thus ever vulnerable to demagoguery—and since combat risk projections by ethnic leaders and opinion-makers are usually based (not unnaturally) upon ethnic representation in the total force rather than in frontline combat units. Ironically, according to Moskos and Butler, the percentage of blacks in the infantry has dropped steadily from 30 percent in 1980 to 15 percent currently, while the portion of blacks in logistics units today often runs in excess of 50 percent. Moskos and Butler believe that “the reasons for and consequences of this development require attention.”¹⁵ The lesson for the Army is clear: as the Hispanic share of the U.S. population climbs toward 25 percent by the middle of the next century, a figure double that of blacks, a correspondingly rising share of Hispanics is likely to find its way into the Army’s ranks. If this development is not managed with care, the same cannon-fodder charges that have dogged the Army with respect to blacks could begin to emerge with respect to Hispanics.

Nor do causes for concern cease here. Linda Chavez, president of the Center for Equal Opportunity in Washington and author of *Out of the Barrio: Toward a New Politics of Assimilation* (Basic Books), has reported on an episode in Los Angeles in February 1998 that could well represent a premonitory microcosm of larger movements in the future:

A crowd of over 91,000 fans, made up predominantly of Latinos who live and work in southern California, gathered for the Gold Cup soccer match between the Mexican and U.S. national teams. They did not come to root for the home team. Rather, they booed and whistled through the singing of *The Star Spangled Banner*, and then proceeded to pelt the players on the American team with food, bottles, and cans. . . . A Mexican-American fan complained bitterly that he and his young son had been sprayed with beer and soda for having the temerity to display a small American flag. . . . Dozens of . . .

letter-writers expressed their disgust with Hispanic immigrants who were happy to take advantage of American jobs, education, medical care, and welfare benefits while spitting on American symbols.¹⁶

In graphic language, Mrs. Chavez has broached one of the most sensitive but crucial questions arising from the Hispanic immigration movement: Will Hispanics, particularly those of Mexican ancestry who reside in the belt of southwestern U.S. border states contiguous to Mexico, assimilate into the American melting pot like other ethnic groups, or will they instead remain a separate community within a community, maintaining their original language, identity, culture, and national loyalty?

Mrs. Chavez feels that prospects for assimilation are poor, noting the low rates of naturalization ("even after nearly 20 years of U.S. residence, it seems that fewer than one in five Mexican-Americans chooses to acquire American citizenship") and the resistance to learning English ("as of 1990, three-quarters of Mexican immigrants who arrived in the 1980s still spoke little or no English; about one quarter of *all* Mexican immigrants have not learned to speak English even after decades in the U.S.").¹⁷ Tad Szulc, in comparison, takes a more upbeat view of the Hispanic community-within-community approach to life in the United States:

The Ramoses [for example] are a proud Mexican-American family, participating fully in American life without relinquishing their Mexican identity. In many ways, their story reflects that of other Hispanics across the U.S. The ability to come to terms with two identities is perhaps the secret of the rich Hispanic culture that has taken root in this country. . . . Ultimately, the Spanish language is the great unifier of the rich and disparate Hispanic culture. And that culture—in all its vibrant accents and through its music, food, literature, and political concerns—is braiding itself into the diverse American fabric and becoming, at the advent of the 21st century, a new *American culture*.¹⁸

The sentiment expressed above, which evokes the multiculturalist movement that has taken hold in American education over the past quarter of a century, is by no means shared by all. No less an observer than Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., who has always marched in the vanguard of the civil rights movement in this country, in a 1992 book disagreed with the view "that a main objective of public education should be the protection, strengthening, celebration, and perpetuation" of different ethnic identities.¹⁹ If the "cult of ethnicity" ever became fully ascendant in this country, it could in Schlesinger's view threaten the unity, cohesion, and identity that define us as a nation.

Fortunately, we need not enter this great national debate except to note its implications for recruiting the future Army. Two points are salient. First, the level of English language fluency among the Hispanic 18-24 age cohort could impair our ability to make full use of this growing segment of the U.S. population. As the Information Age comes fully into view, the U.S. Army will become a communicating army like no army before it, and it will require soldiers who write and speak a common language. Lacking such facility, soldiers would be unable to transact with fellow soldiers in the elementary grammar of war, and they could be unable to capitalize upon the technological manna that daily descends upon the forces. Those responsible for raising and training the Army After Next will need to give the language question a great deal of hard thought.

Second, despite the possibility that language could pose problems for the incorporation of Hispanic youth in national defense, it seems nonetheless inevitable that the sheer numbers in the recruiting pool will make themselves felt and that some units in the Army might eventually experience Hispanic representation on the order of 20 to 40 percent, the largest share of which could be of Mexican derivation.²⁰ A hint of things to come can be seen in the Army's accession figures for Hispanics since FY 1985, showing a steady annual rise from 3.5 percent to about 10

percent today.²¹ We earlier glanced at the likelihood of “cannon-fodder” charges when casualty figures of particular ethnic groups are perceived to grow significantly out of line.

Of course, the problems presented by recruit diversity are not exclusively ethnic. Gender integration has brought its own distinct set of problems, and, if anything, the resulting dialogue has been marked by far more heat and acrimony than has ethnic discussion. Jean Holm, who has written perhaps the best and most evenhanded brief history of women in the armed forces, here describes the deliberations of the blue-ribbon, 15-member Presidential Commission on Women’s Assignments, which rendered its report in November 1992:

Almost from the outset the commission’s meetings were contentious and combative. Discussions frequently degenerated into rancorous debate . . . Each [side] accused the other of closed minds and bad faith . . . The report . . . was described by many as a partisan mess and, as expected, stirred up a firestorm of criticism.²²

But what precisely is the nub of the controversy today? All statutory combat exclusions affecting women have been repealed. By policy, women are permitted to compete for assignments in aircraft, including those engaged in combat missions. They are permitted assignment to ships on combat missions.²³ The main remaining policy bar to combat participation by women lies in the directive that they not be assigned “to units engaged in direct combat on the ground,”²⁴ which ostensibly would prohibit assignments to infantry, armor, cavalry, artillery, and combat engineers, though the de facto prohibitions will likely be subject to evolving interpretation.

The story of the gradual opening of military assignments to women is the story of continual unyielding pressure by sincere female service members and their advocates to secure as many openings as possible, with the ultimate goal of abolishing all exclusions. Meanwhile, many sincere male service members and their advocates, motivated by the

conviction that women are generally less fit for combat than men, argue that assignments should reflect this distinction. I have tried to flesh out the positions of the two camps with the narratives below, which are intentionally expressed in tones of dogmatic certitude.

According to the "Traditionalist" argument, the most powerful chemical warfare agent known to science is testosterone, the vital masculinizing hormone produced primarily by males. It is responsible for the size, strength, and aggressiveness that distinguish the male from the female. All other factors being equal, a male army will defeat a female army. All other factors being equal, a male army will defeat a coed army. If two male armies fight, the victor will be the one with the least feminizing acculturation, all other factors being equal. If, in the name of equal rights or equal economic opportunity, government selects the less fit to fight its wars, it betrays its sacred trust to protect the people and preserve the nation.

The Feminist²⁵ responds that war is no longer epitomized by individual soldiers engaged in hand-to-hand combat, where victory goes to the combatant with more physical prowess and brawn. War instead has become a corporate endeavor, fought by complex organizations at great distances, employing technology to locate the enemy and advanced weaponry to destroy him. In place of soldiers who are big, fast, strong, and fierce, the Army of the future will require those who are smart, educated, technically trainable, and able to work compatibly as members of a team, traits a woman can supply as well and perhaps better than a man. In modern warfare, soldiers seldom lay eyes on an actual enemy, instead relying on sensors to find him and stand-off weapons to destroy him. A woman can operate sensing devices and activate automated weapons as well as a man. Defending one's country is at once a right, a privilege, and an obligation, accruing under the Constitution to women as well as men. Our country is far better served by a willing female soldier than a reluctant male. Even if it were demonstrable that some few positions

must be reserved for the brute male, the vast majority of roles can be satisfactorily performed by females. In the final analysis, the argument is moot because the realities of the recruiting market in the era of the all-volunteer force will dictate an increasing share of women in the Army.

As we progress into the new century, we can expect the tension between the Traditionalist and Feminist positions on women's assignments to be played out against the backdrop of continued evolution in the technology and methods of warfare, fluctuations in the military budget and manpower ceilings as dictated by Congress, national economic conditions, and variations in the size, quality, and attitudes of the available manpower--and womanpower--pool. Over the last 15 years, the proportion of women in the Army has risen continuously; today one in every five soldiers inducted is female.²⁶

Except for judicial tests in the nation's higher courts, controversy with respect to homosexuals in the military has been generally muted since implementation of the "don't ask, don't tell, don't pursue" policy in July 1993. In September of the same year, Congress inserted a clause in the National Defense Authorization Act that could make it harder for presidents in the future to relax the present policy, which requires discharge of any military member who engages in a homosexual act. The clause inserted by Congress declares that "persons who demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts would create an unacceptable risk to the high standards of morale, good order and discipline."²⁷

During the national debates in 1992-93 leading up to the "don't ask, don't tell, don't pursue" policy, homosexual advocates sought to draw an analogy between the predicament of homosexuals at that time and the predicament of blacks seeking full integration into the armed forces in 1948. Just as charges that the integration of blacks into the ranks would destroy unit cohesion proved false, according to homosexual proponents, similar fears

about the inclusion of homosexuals would prove false. However, General Colin Powell and Lieutenant General Calvin Waller, both prominent black officers, expressed disagreement with such an analogy. Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 29, 1993, for example, General Waller pointed out that blacks cannot change or conceal the blackness for which they suffer discrimination. By way of contrast, according to Waller, homosexuals can change or conceal their homosexual behavior, a fact that renders the African-American experience entirely different.²⁸

Because of the silence imposed by the "don't ask, don't tell" policy, we cannot be sure how many homosexuals are entering the Army under the resulting umbrella. The formulation does represent a liberalization of pre-1993 policy, however, in the sense that homosexual soldiers can expect a reduced threat of exposure, meaning that their numbers may well increase in the future force.²⁹

Turning to the subject of religious diversity, we find that the proliferation of faiths represented in the Army can potentially present special problems in terms of requirements for distinctive, religion-imposed apparel, uniform accoutrements, diet, medical needs, times of duty, and hair length and grooming, as well as for faith-specific worship facilities.³⁰ The yarmulke for Conservative Jewish male soldiers and the turban, beard, and other particularities for Sikhs are examples of issues encountered in the past. To codify policy in this area, the Army promulgated AR 600-20, *Accommodation of Religious Practices Within the U.S. Army*, in 1986.³¹ The current version of the regulation notes that "a complete prohibition on the wearing of any visible item of religious apparel may be appropriate under unique circumstances," but the commander is allowed to make the final decision.³² In practice thus far, commanders have construed the regulation liberally and the issue has generated little controversy in the ranks.³³ Potential for controversy always lies just beneath the surface, however, particularly if issues

are seized upon by outside agitators and politicized through the news media.

In the two chapters that immediately follow, we will locate the recruit diversity phenomenon within the broad context of civil-military relations, since such relations can be decisive in the Army's efforts to raise an optimum force in the face of a radically changing recruitment pool. Subsequent chapters will focus primarily upon the ethnic aspects of diversity, because it is in this area that the greatest changes from patterns of the past are likely to occur.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 1

1. Alvin Toffler, "Introduction: Probing Tomorrow," in *The Futurists*, ed. Alvin Toffler, New York: Random House, 1972, p. 3.

2. Technically, the term "Hispanic" applies to those native to Spain, Spain-Portugal, or Latin America. In the eastern United States, those of Spanish descent prefer to call themselves Hispanic, while in the American Southwest, they prefer Latino (compare Latin American). Chicanos, Americans of Mexican descent, represent a subset of Latinos. Despite regional preferences, Hispanic and Latino are essentially interchangeable. "Anglo" is the term used by Hispanics and Latinos to refer to non-Hispanic whites. See Tad Szulc, "The Fastest-Growing Minority in America," *Parade Magazine*, January 3, 1999, pp. 4-7. In the taxonomy employed by the U.S. Bureau of the Census, persons of Hispanic origin may be of any race, including of course white and black. The Bureau classifies "Hispanic origin" as an ethnicity. When the terms white and black are used in this book for demographic purposes, they are understood to refer to non-Hispanic whites and non-Hispanic blacks, respectively. The population figures given here and below derive from *Statistical Abstract of the United States 1997*, 117th edition, U.S. Department of Commerce, October 1997, Table 19, p. 19. The figures for "today" are actually projections for 1999 made in 1997. Information on the taxonomy used by the Bureau is taken from Section 1, pp. 4-5, of *Statistical Abstract*. For an excellent brief discussion of U.S. national population projections with special attention to ethnic trends, see U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P23-194, *Population Profile of the United States: 1997*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998, pp. 2-3, 6-9, 42-47, 52-53.

3. Thomas B. Edsall and Gwen Ifill, "Farrakhan Accuses U.S. of Acting to Hurt Blacks," *Washington Post*, April 24, 1989, p. A3.

4. Szulc, p. 6.

5. "Ethnic" is a protean term that can apply to a variety of group classifications such as common racial, national, tribal, religious, linguistic, or cultural background. In America's past, ethnicity has often been used to refer to original nationality in contradistinction to race, which cuts across national boundaries. In the present book, "ethnic" will generally apply to both race and nationality, but if a different sense is intended the meaning will be clear from the context.

6. Nick Adde, "Don't Ask, Don't Tell' Ruled Constitutional," *Army Times*, October 5, 1998, p. 20.

7. G. E. Willis, "Are Troops More Tolerant on Sex?" *Army Times*, October 5, 1998, p. 20.

8. John W. Brinsfield, Jr., *The United States Army Chaplaincy, 1975-1995*, 2 parts, Washington, DC: Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Chaplains, 1997, pt. 1, p. 70. Chaplain (Colonel) Brinsfield's book is a work of consummate scholarship, serving as an excellent starting point for those who wish to delve deeper into the subject of religious diversity in the Army.

9. *Ibid.*, pt. 1, p. 437.

10. *Ibid.*, pt. 1, pp. 437-438.

11. *Ibid.*, pt. 1, p. 440.

12. *Ibid.*, pt. 1, p. 331.

13. David J. Armor, "Race and Gender in the U.S. Military," *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 23, No. 1, Fall 1996, pp. 7-27.

14. Charles Moskos and John Sibley Butler, "Racial Integration the Army Way," *ARMY Magazine*, July 1998, pp. 30-31; see also Armor, p. 22. Moskos and Butler also make a useful point regarding the fine line the Army must walk in dealing with this sensitive point: "The large number of African-Americans in the Army seemingly poses a 'peacetime benefit' versus 'wartime burden' dilemma. In times of war, the disproportionate numbers of blacks in the Army are seen as inflicting casualties on America's most victimized group. In times of peace, these same numbers are viewed as employment opportunities for African-Americans" (p. 30).

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15. Moskos and Butler, p. 31.
 16. Linda Chavez, "Our Hispanic Predicament," *Commentary*, June 1998, p. 47.
 17. Chavez, p. 49.
 18. Szulc, pp. 5-6.
 19. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Disuniting of America*, New York: W. W. Norton, 1992, pp. 9-20. See also James W. Ceaser and Patrick J. McGuinn, "Civic Education Reconsidered," *The Public Interest*, No. 133, Fall 1998, pp. 84-103.
 20. Chavez, p. 48.
 21. For the Hispanic accession figures since FY 1985, see United States Army Recruiting Command, "Accession Demographics (Includes Prior Service)," June 1, 1998, p. 1. Hispanics constitute nearly 14 percent of the U.S. population today according to Szulc (p. 6); from *Statistical Abstract*, however, we derive a figure of 11.2 percent (Table 19, p. 19).
 22. Jean M. Holm, "Women in the Armed Forces," in *Encyclopedia of the American Military*, Vol. III, ed. John E. Jessup and Louise B. Ketz, New York: Charles Scribner's, 1994, p. 2020.
 23. *Ibid.*, pp. 2020, 2025; Armor, p. 8.
 24. Holm, p. 2025.
 25. I use the terms "Traditionalist" and "Feminist" as convenient shorthand, confining their application solely to the positions on female soldiers' assignments herein set forth. In using these terms, I have no wish to associate the issues at hand with such larger themes as the "war between the sexes," the women's movement, or feminist ideology, though I recognize of course that there will be those who make such connections. I acknowledge also, of course, that not all male soldiers oppose women in combat and not all women support it.
 26. United States Army Recruiting Command, "Accession Demographics (Includes Prior Service)," June 1, 1998, p. 1.
 27. Judith H. Stiehm, "Sexual Orientation and the Military," in *Encyclopedia of the American Military*, Vol. III, ed. John E. Jessup and Louise B. Ketz, New York: Charles Scribner's, 1994, pp. 2061-2071.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 2067.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 2070.

30. Brinsfield, pt. 1, pp. 187-188, 259-263.

31. *Ibid.*, pt. 1, pp. 188, 259-261, 436.

32. The subject of accommodating religious practices has since been incorporated in AR 600-20, now titled *Army Command Policy*, dated March 30, 1988 (with Interim Change I04, dated September 17, 1993), para. 5-6. For the quotation, see para. 5-6.h.(4)(a)6. on pp. 16-17. See also Brinsfield, pt. 1, p. 261.

33. Brinsfield, pt. 1, p. 290, n. 138.

CHAPTER 2

THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE AND THEIR ARMY: A NEGATIVE EXAMPLE FOR AMERICA

Robert Pringle

INTRODUCTION

Discussion of diversity issues affecting an army usually arises within the larger context of the relations between that army and the civilian population of the nation involved. If we are truly to understand how diversity considerations affect an army, whether for better or worse, we must first gain some appreciation of the society from which soldiers are drawn. Society's attitude toward the military, particularly insofar as that attitude is reflected in the views of potential recruits, can be a decisive factor not only in recruiting a quality force, but also in maintaining the morale and viability of the force once it is raised.

Unfortunately, contemplation of diversity issues facing the U.S. army today, not to mention the high-tempo operational uses and commitments of its soldiers in this still-dangerous world, is a subject overladen with strong feelings. Questions of ethnic and gender equity, to which are superadded questions of placing our children in harm's way, form an extraordinarily emotive brew, and it is most difficult to discern the path of wisdom when emotions become engaged.

At such times, to regain our analytical detachment, it can be helpful to shift our scrutiny to a competing model, one that is emotively neutral but yet sufficiently analogous to our own to be instructive. For this purpose, we shall examine the situation in Russia, where the army and the people have come to the point of undisguised mutual hostility. Armed with a perspective of events in Russia, we

shall be better prepared to view the situation in our own country in a more dispassionate light.

HISTORICAL HERITAGE

During the heyday of the Soviet Union, three institutions constituted the political troika on which power was based: the Communist Party, the Committee of State Security (KGB), and the Red army. Of these three, the army had the greatest legitimacy and enjoyed the most popular support. If, in the eyes of the people, the Party and the KGB represented the authority and the power, the army was of the people themselves. How was it possible, then, for it to have lost standing so rapidly during the waning days of the Cold War and in post-Cold War democratic Russia?

Ties between the people and the Red army were cemented by the terrible cost of victory in what Soviet citizens called the "Great Patriotic War." More than 25 million members of the Soviet armed forces were killed or wounded in the war against Nazi Germany.¹ To put these losses into perspective, the Red army in 1941 lost almost twice as many men killed in the 10-week defense of Moscow—514,338—than the United States lost in combat in all of World War II.² The war created a set of genuinely popular uniformed heroes seemingly untouched by the horrors of the Stalin terror.

During the post-Stalin period, the Party and the Ministry of Defense further publicized the cult of victory to enhance the regime's legitimacy. Victory Day on May 9 became one of the most important and most popular annual holidays. Military art became a major state industry; for example, statues from Volgograd to Berlin celebrated the role of the Soviet soldier and officer in defending the motherland and "liberating" the countries of Eastern Europe.³

During the Brezhnev years (1964-82), the Soviet armed forces continued to be the subject of uncritical adulation.

Mandatory military service was seen as a “school of life,” integral to becoming a man. Thousands of books, articles, poems, plays, and movies highlighted the role of the military in defeating the German Fascists and defending the country against imperialism. Children’s books celebrated the brave border guards and soldiers, while Brezhnev’s memoirs of the war embroidered his own role as a brigade political commissar in fighting the Nazis.⁴ Brezhnev’s book sold millions of copies, as did memoirs by other leaders.

Beneath the surface, however, there was evidence of growing popular discontent within society and the military itself with regard to the regime’s management of the armed forces. Stories of the mistreatment of draftees circulated in the press. Of greater concern to the leadership was the participation of junior army and naval officers in dissident movements and in at least two acts of political violence—an attempt against the life of Brezhnev in 1969 and the hijacking of a destroyer by several junior officers in 1975.⁵ Even Brezhnev’s overblown military reputation became the butt of underground political humor. In one joke, Stalin, during a particularly difficult moment in the war, invites Brigade Commander Brezhnev to the Kremlin to ask him how to defeat the Wehrmacht.

CRACKS IN THE EDIFICE

General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev came to power only weeks after the 40th anniversary of the Nazis’ surrender. His speech on Victory Day 1985 extolled the role of the Red army and the Party’s leadership in defeating Germany. Nevertheless, it was Gorbachev’s policy of *glasnost* (openness) that legitimized criticism of the military, especially in the handling of draftees and the conduct of the war in Afghanistan. By the 1980s, the deaths of thousands of draftees because of hazing had become one of the dirty little secrets of Soviet society. Articles in the press beginning in 1988 reported how nasty and brutal life

was for the average recruit, and how the army permitted violence against new draftees that annually killed or drove thousands to commit suicide. The war in Afghanistan, which Gorbachev described as a “bleeding wound” in a speech to the Communist Party conference, had become unpopular by 1986. Families resented sending their children “there”—that is, to Afghanistan. Press reports of how poorly the army honored their dead, how the children of the privileged class were spared duty in Afghanistan, and how blunders cost draftees their lives, colored public perceptions of the armed forces.

The rediscovery of Soviet history, another aspect of *glasnost*, led to a further reduction of the moral authority of the army. Books and articles based on declassified information about the Great Patriotic War raised questions about military brutality and mismanagement. For the first time, World War II military orders were made public that equated being taken prisoner with treason, stipulating that families of prisoners of war would suffer dire consequences. As a veteran of the partisan movement put it in assessing the cost of victory, “In paying an immense price for the victory over Hitler, the people facilitated the complete victory of Stalin’s absolute tyranny.”⁶

It was Gorbachev’s decision to use the military to contain and suppress nationalist violence, however, that did the most damage to the military’s crumbling reputation. Alexander Lebed, earlier an airborne regimental and division commander, noted in his memoirs that the use of elite airborne divisions to police nationalist disturbances in Azerbaijan, Armenia, Central Asia, and the Baltic exacerbated ethnic tensions throughout the military, and created a growing rift between the army and society (let America pay heed). Writing of the impact first of the Afghan War and then of political intervention, Lebed wrote:

This incompetent political adventure, this attempt to export our revolution, which had not justified itself, spelled the beginning of the end. In 1986 Alma-Ata caught fire, and then Karabakh,

Fergana, Georgia, Tajikistan . . . and on it spread. The number of those killed and wounded on Soviet Union territory has long since outstripped the number killed on Afghan soil.⁷

YELTSIN'S RUSSIA, WHOSE ARMY?

In December 1991, Russia's new president, Boris Yeltsin, inherited a world-class army that had been badly compromised during the final days of the Soviet regime. Elite airborne regiments had been rushed to Moscow to take part in the abortive August 1991 coup, and we now know that violence was only narrowly averted on several occasions.⁸ Moreover, Yeltsin, who had no active-duty military experience, selected an airborne commander, General Pavel Grachev, to head the Ministry of Defense based on the sole qualification that he had not supported the August coup that would have restored the Soviet old guard.⁹ It is therefore hardly surprising that efforts by Yeltsin to manage the Russian army have been unsuccessful and have broadened the gap between the army and society into an abyss. In attempting to understand the army's loss of legitimacy, we shall discuss in turn the following four interrelated issues: the failure of military reform; military corruption; hazing; and the war in Chechnya.

The Failure of Military Reform.

During his battles with Communist Party chief Gorbachev, Yeltsin had called for a reformed, apolitical Russian military establishment. While these demands played well in the reformist Moscow media (and the West), Yeltsin quickly demonstrated on taking power that he had little idea of how to implement reform of the military establishment. The military budget was repeatedly slashed, but little effort was made to reduce the size of the officer corps, restructure the components of the Ministry of Defense, or redefine the mission of the Russian army.

During the Soviet period, the armed forces had become top-heavy. Russian journalists with ties to the military

estimated that the Russian armed forces had four times as many flag officers as the American, far in excess of what the relative sizes of the two forces would have justified. Gorbachev made no effort to control the perks of the officer corps in the late 1980s, but rather accepted military privilege as natural, much like the political benefits enjoyed by the Party elite. Yeltsin has chosen to manage the armed forces as a benevolent, if distant, administrator. Loyalty rather than competence has been rewarded. Two ministers of defense have been dismissed as well as a chief of the general staff and other senior officers. The Russian president, however, has systematically refused to appoint a civilian minister of defense, preferring to divide power between political appointees in the National Security Council and military officers on the general staff. In doing this, Yeltsin has demonstrated a preference to see power remain divided between powerful subordinates rather than initiate real reform.

Yeltsin has made no effort to restructure the officer corps. Rather than turning to a civilian minister of defense, Yeltsin has allowed a general staff that was socialized, promoted, and rewarded by the Soviet system to manage the transition from the Soviet era to democracy. It turned out to be the critical error. While the high command was markedly successful in managing its stockpile of nuclear weapons, it failed to cope with myriad problems associated with the end of the Cold War.

Restructuring of the forces has also fallen on hard times. The armed forces of the Soviet Union were concentrated in three competing bureaucracies. While the Ministry of Defense was responsible for the lion's share of personnel, more than 400,000 soldiers served in the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Interior and the Chief Directorate of Border Guards of the KGB. Moreover, the Defense Ministry was divided into five major components, each with its own installations, staffs, and military schools. In all, the Ministry of Defense had more than 100 schools training junior officers. It would have taken a platoon of military

Solomons to restructure the new Russian armed forces in a time of rapidly declining financial support, but none were readily available.

Attempts at restructuring since 1992 have led to chaos, not order. Today, more than a dozen separate Russian government organizations have their own armed forces. Besides the Ministry of Defense, these include the Ministry of Interior, the Federal Security Service, the Presidential Security Organization, the Main Security Directorate, and the Directorate of Emergency Services. According to a senior defense ministry official, these other armed forces "are bigger than the army and the fleet," continuing to grow while the Defense Ministry faces severe financial problems.¹⁰

With the end of the Cold War and the decamping of the Soviet republics, the Russian soldier lost not only much of his "motherland" but lost his historical national mission as well. New political developments raised questions as to who was a Russian soldier, and what exactly was he to defend. Was a man with a Ukrainian surname, born in Georgia of a Russian mother and a Jewish father, a Russian? (A recent Russian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister have exactly that lineage.) If NATO, the United States, or China was no longer the enemy, who or what was?

More important, politicization of the armed forces has intensified during the post-Soviet period. A noted Russian military correspondent wrote that Yeltsin's notion of civilian control of the military is that he alone shall exercise such control lest someone else develop a power base.¹¹ Army troops have been used on several occasions since 1991 to quell internal unrest—traditionally the responsibility of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. For example, in October 1993, Yeltsin used troops from the elite 2nd Guards Infantry and 4th Guards Armor Divisions to quash a parliamentary revolt. Tank and small arms fire set the government building on fire, and in the following fight more than 150 Russian soldiers and civilians were killed.

Then, in June 1995, 4,000 paratroopers from the elite 98th and 106th Airborne Divisions were deployed to Moscow to help the city police operate against suspected Chechen terrorism.¹²

Military Corruption.

Limited anecdotal evidence suggests that corruption had begun to be a problem for the Soviet army in the 1980s. According to one military joke, a senior military officer is asked, "Why can't the children of generals become marshals?" The answer: "Well, the marshals have children, too." During the 1980s, senior military officers commonly built luxurious dachas in the Moscow environs using military money and military labor. Other military commanders leased their units to both Party officials and underground millionaires for everything from home building to guard services.

During the last years of the Gorbachev regime, stories of military corruption began to percolate through the press. Then after Yeltsin came to power, this stream of stories became a flood. Accounts appeared in the press of military corruption involving senior officers in Moscow. Following a story involving corruption in the Ministry of Defense, an intrepid reporter was killed by a sophisticated bomb hidden in a briefcase. The Russian media reported rumors that the bomb had been placed by senior GRU (Military Intelligence) officers on the order of General Pavel Grachev.

Efforts to stem military corruption by the police and military have largely failed, and it remains a public scandal further undermining the Russian army's relationship with society. According to reports in the Russian media, food for garrisons in the Russian Far East has been sold by senior officers. As a result, there has been malnutrition and at least one case of starvation in troop units.

Hazing.

By 1990, draft evasion had become a major problem for the Soviet army. According to all sources, the major reason for evasion and desertion was hazing. In the last days of the Soviet regime, organizations such as Shield and Soldiers' Mothers were organized to protect the rights of servicemen, and their work intensified public concern about the treatment of conscripts.

The Yeltsin regime has made no effort to cope with the hazing problem. Information from voluntary organizations, the media, and parliamentary investigations indicate that the problem continues throughout the armed forces. An investigation by the Duma found that during a recent 28-month period, more than 2,500 Russian servicemen committed suicide, most of them presumably owing to hazing.¹³ Even in elite units such as the Dzerzhinskiy Division, hazing is tolerated and encouraged. A Russian human rights commission found that 100 soldiers had suffered severe trauma and injuries from such treatment.¹⁴

The impact of hazing on society's perception of the military has been drastically negative. Draft-dodging has become commonplace. The army admitted in March 1998 that 70,000 youths avoided conscription the previous year, and that 40,000 deserters were on the run. Surveys of the Russian media show growing disrespect for the profession of arms and military service. According to a military correspondent, there is an acute shortage of junior officers in the army today as thousands of lieutenants and captains have recently resigned.¹⁵

The War in Chechnya.

For many Russians the Chechen War, waged between Moscow and the tiny breakaway republic from December 1994 to August 1996, was an epiphany. The failure of the military to win a decisive victory against the rebels, the highly visible military incompetence, and its brutal

disregard of civilian casualties as well as its disrespect for its own dead signaled that the army was no longer of the people.

Despite the claim by Grachev that the Chechen capital Grozny could be taken by an armored regiment in a single morning, it took elements of several divisions weeks to capture the city. According to Western and Russian journalists on the scene, Chechen rebels killed over 1,500 Russian soldiers on the war's first day as they sought to fight their way into the Chechen capital. In the fighting in Grozny and other Chechen cities, artillery, armor, and helicopter gunships were used against heavily populated centers—including areas inhabited by Russians. Russian commanders made little effort to retrieve the bodies of their own soldiers and return them to their families. There was little or no effort to locate or identify Russian dead or 1,900 missing on the Chechen battlefield.¹⁶

THE "NATIONALITIES" PROBLEM

The USSR was a multinational state encompassing well over a 100 ethnic groups. It was the only world power in which the ascendant nationality—in its case, the Russians—barely held a majority. Despite their long attempts at Russification, the Soviets were never able to extinguish the flame of nationalism among the main ethnic minorities.¹⁷ Though the Russian language was supposed to be the lingua franca of the Soviet Union, the percentage of members of the main ethnic groups claiming Russian as a mother tongue remained minuscule for the most part, while even the percentage of those claiming fluency in Russian as a second language remained surprisingly low.

In 1970, for example, the figures for Ukrainians were 14.2 percent and 36.3 percent, respectively, meaning that nearly 50 percent lacked fluency in the official language of the Soviet Union. So far as ethnic minorities further removed from the European center were concerned, the situation was even more dismal.¹⁸ With a population so

heterogeneous in so many ways, the Soviets were never able to assimilate the nationalities into a unified, fully integrated body politic.

The collapse of the Moscow coup in August 1991 set in motion forces of disintegration, resulting in the eventual declaration of independence by 14 of the 15 republics comprising the USSR, leaving only the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, now known formally as the Russian Federation ("Russia," in short form). With the loss of the ethnic republics in almost a single stroke, the Russian Federation found its nationalities problem mitigated to some extent, though the problem has by no means disappeared.¹⁹ True, the percentage of Russians rose from 53-55 percent of the population to about 82 percent today.²⁰ But there are still over 100 languages spoken in Russia and over 100 national minorities, including Tatars (3.8 percent), Ukrainians (3.0 percent), Chuvash (1.2 percent), Bashkirs (.9 percent), Belorussians (.8 percent), etc.²¹

In fact, 32 ethnically designated jurisdictions had been established within Russia by 1996.²² The Russian population peaked at nearly 149 million people in 1991 and has been shrinking since, a trend expected to continue at least through the year 2005, particularly among males.²³ To the extent that military recruiting focuses on ethnic minorities to make up for shortfalls among Russian youth, the problems of ethnic nationalism and language inadequacy become correspondingly more important because they can erode discipline and cohesion within military units.²⁴

It would be a mistake for Americans to attempt to find a mirror image of their own diversity situation in the nationalities context of Russia. But as issues of American ethnic diversity are explored in subsequent chapters of this book, it may prove illuminating to recall by way of comparison the USSR's and now Russia's experiences with their own unique brands of "diversity."

TOPICS FOR REFLECTION

In 1997, a leading Moscow foreign policy research group reported that the Russian army was rapidly becoming a threat to the Russian people and their government even though it could not defend them against any foreign foe. The study predicted that, unless appropriate steps were taken, the Russian army would either “disappear as such, break up into armed groups which will support themselves through arms sales and robbery, or even stage a coup”—any one of which could produce dictatorship or civil war.²⁵ The prospect of such a calamitous schism between the military and the populace in Russia provides food for thought for all politico-military observers, regardless of nationality:

- **Political Leadership is Critical.** Military reform requires sustained political leadership, as the transformation of the Spanish military following Franco and reform efforts in Latin American militaries confirm. In the United States, Congress supported the executive branch in a decade-long effort to transform the degraded Vietnam-era army into an effective all-volunteer force. In Russia, however, Yeltsin's style of government militated against reform. Yeltsin offered the Russian general staff the most corrupt of bargains—stay loyal, and you keep your perks and dictate the pace and substance of reform. As many U.S. analysts of post-Soviet military affairs have pointed out, a painful but necessary revolution in military thinking has not occurred in tandem with the drastic budget reductions.²⁶
- **An Army in Transition Needs Popular Support.** In a time of troubles, a country's military needs widespread popular support to accomplish its mission. By neglecting questions dealing with military corruption and the treatment of recruits—questions of urgent concern to the public—the Russian army forfeited what remained of

public confidence in it. In a country such as Russia where large segments of the population were impoverished by attempted economic reform and where a declining birthrate often produced families with only one child, the death of a son usually meant far greater personal tragedy and material hardship than was the case in countries enjoying higher birthrates.

- **War in Time of Reform Is Especially Dangerous.**

Three times in this century Russian rulers have been undone by what were supposed to be "small victorious wars." The Russo-Japanese War of 1905-06, military intervention in Afghanistan in 1980-88, and the Chechen war in 1994-96 all discouraged efforts to conduct reform. Afghanistan and Chechnya, moreover, damaged the Russian armed forces in the eyes of the population. Several decorated Russian officers complained about sending "untrained kids" into combat. The Russian army learned nothing in Afghanistan. It repeated the same mistakes in Chechnya that it made in the Hindu Kush a decade earlier, and the resulting deaths of thousands of teenage Russian conscripts mortally damaged the prestige of the army as a national institution.²⁷ A recent opinion poll showed that 82 percent of young Russian men did not want to serve in the armed forces.

- **Anything Taken for Granted Will Be Lost.** Senior officers seem to have taken as a given the comforting shibboleths of the Soviet period, failing to factor in the impact of open news media on society and the armed forces. In the Soviet period, billboards proclaiming the eternal unity of the Soviet people, the glories of work, and the eventual victory of Leninism were everywhere. By the late 1980s, they had become shopworn myths of the aging Soviet state. The cult of military victory also had gone stale by the 1980s,

meaning little to the generations born after the Red army stormed the Reichstag. The military universally extolled as the “school of life” under the Soviets is now loathed by Russian sons as a hellish prison to be avoided at all costs. The estrangement between the Russian people and its army is now complete, providing an instructive lesson for those in the United States concerned with civil-military relations.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2

1. David M. Glantz and Jonathan House, *When Titans Clashed*, Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1995, p. 292. These figures, long kept secret by the Soviet regime, were recently declassified.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 294.

3. Nina Tumarkin, *The Living and the Dead: The Rise and Fall of the Cult of World War II in Russia*, New York: Basic Books, 1994, pp. 95-124.

4. *Malaya Zemlya (The Little Land)* was the name given to a beachhead created near Novorossiysk in southern Russia in 1943 by Soviet naval infantry. Brezhnev was a brigade commissar with the landing force.

5. For the mutiny on the *Starezhevoi (Sentry)*, see *Washington Post*, November 18, 1992, p. A25.

6. Quoted in Tumarkin, p. 207.

7. Alexander Lebed, *My Life and My Country*, p. 130. The Russian title—*I am Ashamed of My Country*—is far more revealing.

8. See John B. Dunlop, *The Rise of Russia and the Decline of the Soviet Union*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993, pp. 194ff.

9. Yeltsin had received a reserve commission on graduation from an engineering faculty and was promoted within the reserves to the rank of colonel without ever having served on active duty. Boris Yeltsin, *The Struggle for Russia*, New York: Random House, 1994, p. 239.

10. Scott Parrish, “Yeltsin Replaces Chief of General Staff,” *Radio Free Europe Analytical Brief* #411. For a brief general commentary on current reform and restructuring efforts, see *Strategic Survey*

1997/1998, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 119-120; and *The Military Balance 1997/1998*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London: Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 101-102.

11. Stephen J. Blank, *Russian Defense Legislation and Russian Democracy*, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1995, p. 3.

12. Yeltsin, pp. 272ff. Yeltsin admits in his memoirs that most senior officers were unwilling at first to get involved in a civil war.

13. TASS, June 10, 1998.

14. *Foreign Reports*, 2475, reviewing articles in the Russian press during the period 1997-98. See also Daniel Williams, "Russian Conscripts Muster Wits to Evade Army," *Washington Post*, December 29, 1998, pp. A1, A11.

15. Vladimir Mukhin, "The Army May Get Out of Control," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, April 17, 1998; Fred Weir, "New Russian Army," *Hindustan Times*, March 1, 1998.

16. Peter Rutland, "Military Lessons of the Chechen War," *RFE/RL Analytical Brief* #427; Carlotta Gall and Thomas de Waal, *Chechnya: Calamity in the Caucasus*, New York, New York University Press, 1998, *passim*; "The Chechen Conflict: A Microcosm of the Russian Army's Past, Present, and Future," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Special Report, September 11, 1996.

17. Richard Pipes, "Introduction: The Nationality Problem," in *Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities*, Zev Katz, *et al.*, eds., New York: Free Press, 1975, pp. 1, 3.

18. Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, with Raymond Sturgeon, *Red Army As the Instrument of National Integration*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, July 31, 1978, p. 10.

19. Glenn E. Curtis, ed., *Russia: A Country Study*, Washington: Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, 1968 [Department of Army Pamphlet 550-115], p. 172.

20. Piper, p. 1; Curtis, pp. xlv, 153.

21. Curtis, pp. 153, 601.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 603.

23. *Ibid.*, pp. 153-155.

24. On the language problem, note Rakowska-Harmstone, p. 9; on the unpopularity of military service in Russia and the consequent recruiting problems, see Curtis, pp. 549-550. Russia's conscription system has proven to be ineffectual, and we are seeing serious discussion of whether to go to a volunteer force. Russia has been experimenting with the use of contract personnel to fill the ranks. By 1996, an estimated 300,000 soldiers were serving on contract (20 percent of the total). Interestingly, more than half of the new contract personnel at that time were women (Curtis, p. 150).

25. Paul Goble, "The Russian Army a Threat to Russia," *RFE/RL Analysis*, February 17, 1997; Curtis, pp. 545-547.

26. See recent studies conducted by the Foreign Military Studies Office and by Stephen Blank at the U.S. Army War College.

27. Gall and de Wall, p. 161. Minister of Interior Plehve recommended war against Japan, reportedly saying that the people needed "a small victorious war to avert the revolution."

CHAPTER 3

THE AMERICAN MILITARY AND THE PEOPLE IT SERVES: TOGETHER OR DRIFTING APART?

John R. Groves, Jr.

This chapter discusses whether there is today a growing estrangement between the U.S. military and the public it serves. The recent experience in Russia as portrayed in the preceding chapter dramatizes the need in America for all parties—particularly the military—to rebuild the bridges between the people and soldiers when they are broken and to strengthen them when they are weak.

FLYING IN FORMATION OR CHAOS IN 3D

When asked, most Americans will express respect for the U.S. military as a venerable, honorable, and essential institution. Service sex scandals in 1996-98 and the recurring allegations of fraud, waste, and mismanagement have done little to diminish a generally high regard for American armed forces.

While many who join the military make it a career, a large percentage remain for a shorter period followed by separation and return to civilian life or continued service in the Reserve or National Guard. In addition, virtually all who remain in uniform for 20 or more years and then retire with full benefits proceed to enter nonmilitary occupations, often for periods longer than the term of their military service. Thus it would seem that the military rank-and-file remain near the occupational mainstream and collective conscious of the nation, helping maintain a strong linkage between grassroots America and its uniformed defenders.

Despite these heartening signs, some respected observers of the military take an opposing view, holding that the military of the United States is becoming increasingly isolated from the people it serves. They offer the following considerations:

Bearing out the proverb, "Out of sight, out of mind," so long as the United States is at peace the American people have increasingly less involvement with the personnel and operations of the military. The result might be a declining appreciation for the needs and costs associated with maintaining an effective defense establishment.

In such a peaceful environment, forced to compete with the nonmilitary social agenda of the nation for scarce resources, senior military commanders may feel compelled to speak out vigorously in ways that seem to grate against the traditional concept of civilian control over the military.¹

The American public has reached—or is perceived by political leaders to have reached—a zero tolerance for casualties in military operations (setting aside major conflicts in which America's existence or core values are threatened). To the extent that the military feels driven to seek funding for new casualty-negating battlefield technologies, these expectations are perpetuated.

Domestic economic and social conditions are affecting the composition of the U.S. armed forces in ways that degrade national security. For example, attracting recruits has become more difficult as our healthy economy offers alternative employment to middle-class high school graduates from which the majority of volunteers have come since the end of the draft. With the consequent diminution of middle-class input to the recruitment pool, in the future fewer political and business leaders will have had military experience. Moreover, recruits who man the future armed forces may be tempting targets for the proliferating extremist hate groups, separatist "militias," and crackpot fringe movements seeking to foment racial and ethnic conflict within military units.²

The growth of the "militias" is a particularly troubling development, especially considering the significant number of current and former military members in their ranks. The factors behind their growth are complex, embracing feelings of disenfranchisement from government and democratic institutions; economic dislocation; and the growing authority of extremist organizations among certain elements of our society. In an ironic twist, the very military that, in extremis, serves to protect the American people from domestic violence, may itself become a tempting target of extremist groups. Indeed, the continuing theft of weapons and explosives from National Guard armories and depots suggests that the threat to the armed forces is continuing to escalate.

THE EFFECT OF A PROLONGED PERIOD OF PEACE

Public support for the military surged briefly during and following Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM in 1990-91. The almost painless victory by coalition forces generated widespread expressions of patriotism. In retrospect, the duration of patriotic fervor seems to have been in almost direct proportion to the length of the conflict. Public response was heartfelt, but the nation quickly returned to business as usual. Indeed, President George Bush, whose popularity soared immediately following the victory, saw a dramatic reversal of support over the next year and was defeated in the 1992 presidential election.

Though the warm glow of public acclaim died quickly following the success of U.S. forces in the Iraqi desert, there were potentially far more enduring effects on popular perceptions. Compared to World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, DESERT SHIELD was of extremely short duration. The actual ground campaign lasted 5 days; American casualties were light; and most American forces returned home quickly. Moreover, while Reserve and National Guard units were utilized, no maneuver forces took part in the ground war. Thus DESERT STORM failed

to test grassroots support for a prolonged and painful Reserve deployment.

In sum, Operation DESERT STORM set before the eyes of the American people a vision of modern war that was remarkable for two reasons. First, it portrayed a war that was resolved quickly and with negligible casualties. Second, it presented to the American people a view of war modeled on the computer games they and their children play, in which smart bombs, precision munitions, and stealth technology replaced the anguish, pain, and terror so graphically associated with Vietnam.

The extent to which DESERT STORM may affect the expectations of Americans remains to be seen. Senior military and civilian leaders believe that in the future the American people will have a lower threshold of tolerance for prolonged, bloody conflicts. The war in the Iraqi desert, therefore, may stand as a benchmark for the next generation of Americans in making judgments on military success, casualties, and duration of hostilities.

INCREASED SERVICE COMPETITION FOR FEDERAL FUNDING

The post-Cold War period has seen a series of internal inquiries within the military to identify the future threats to the nation and to define military needs. *Base Force*, *The Commission on Roles and Missions*, *The Bottom-Up Review*, *The Quadrennial Defense Review*, and *The National Defense Panel* were all created to make recommendations concerning the composition of military forces necessary to support the national security strategy. With Russia no longer qualifying as a peer competitor, this process has been complex and controversial. The period has seen greater emphasis upon new technologies and a substantial reduction in the active and reserve forces. The post-Cold War period has been marked by greater pressure on funding for conventional military activities within the individual services.

Compounding these developments has been an enormous increase in the operational tempo of the forces, producing a greater number of deployments of both active and reserve military units. As a result of these deployments—primarily in the categories of peacetime engagement and conflict prevention—some have opined that the military has lost its warfighting edge.³ Critics fail to realize that this trend has been driven by a redefinition of the main threat to American security. Nevertheless, these trends may sharply alter the role of the citizen-soldier, reduce popular support, and increase friction between active and reserve components.⁴ For example, the use of reserve forces in the Bosnian peacekeeping operation and similar commitments entailing several months of overseas activity duty during peacetime could lead to a revision of the traditional concept “citizen first, soldier second.” Moreover, in such a scenario, it could become far more difficult to convince employers to accept drills and long-term deployment of their employees in time of peace. This, too, may generate conflict between the National Guard and active Army over mission and funding.

A future marked by pressure to reduce military capabilities is not comforting to military leaders. Might these fears, as some have suggested, become so great as to cause senior leaders to consider means that bypass civilian control?⁵ The answer is, not anytime soon, if ever. Nonetheless, if the military of the United States continues to decline, new definitions of national interests may well become necessary for citizen-soldiers, for their commanders, and for the American people.

While it is inconceivable that our military could be so diminished as to lose the capability to repel an invader, the ability of the armed services to project power and enforce the will of the nation upon our enemies is another question.⁶ Military planners have publicly declared that the United States would be hard pressed to mount another campaign like DESERT STORM. Furthermore, although a two major-theater-war (MTW) threat remains the foundation of

current U.S. defense planning guidance, it is even more problematic whether the United States could fight and win two MTWs simultaneously.

Pressure on military resources and operating funds will continue to increase, while at the same time the fundamental mission of the U.S. military to fight and win the nation's wars will remain intact. Several times in the nation's history draconian cuts in defense spending have been mandated. As recently as 1945, the U.S. armed forces were drawn down by nine-tenths of their manpower. The present period of downsizing comes, however, as the United States proclaims its status as the globe's sole remaining superpower. It also comes at a time when technology is changing the role of the soldier, and at a time when the traditional missions of the armed forces have changed.

THE TECHNOLOGY PARADOX

The Army is well on its way to providing not only new weapons, but a wide range of personal protection devices to the individual soldier. New body armor, personal medical monitoring systems, and communications technologies—to cite only a few examples—are in place. The goal is to provide the soldier and his commander with technological tools that minimize casualties and prevent tactical surprise.⁷

A critical question for the military is how this technology will affect its mission and the public's perception of the military's role. On one hand, technology can reduce casualties and improve chances for survival among the wounded. On the other hand, the consequent reduction in casualties raises public expectations for further reductions until the public eventually reaches the point of zero-tolerance. This in turn places pressure on commanders (and political leaders) to put casualty avoidance ahead of mission accomplishment (and national interests) in ordering their priorities. Since Vietnam, the American people have not witnessed large numbers of casualties among their armed forces despite the fact that during the

same period, the military has been increasingly deployed overseas by the National Command Authorities to support national strategic interests. Since Vietnam, many of these deployments have not involved armed conflict—and the same pattern can be expected to continue.

The irony is obvious. Military deployments will continue. Missions will be undertaken in support of national interests as needed. At the same time, however, the evidence suggests that public opinion will remain highly concerned with American casualties and nonsupportive of those operations that put U.S. fighting men and women in harm's way. Public support for DESERT STORM was enhanced as the public realized that American losses were far lower than expected. But American public support for intervention in Somalia evaporated following the ambush of a Ranger company that produced high American losses.

MAINTAINING MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTH

Numerically, the membership of the armed forces amounts to less than one percent of our population. Racial, ethnic, and religious characteristics of the armed forces are generally similar to American society. Most recruits (90-95 percent) enter the military with a high school degree or equivalent. Moreover, senior enlisted members, especially those remaining in the services until retirement, generally maintain economic parity with their nonmilitary cohort during their years of service.

Since the beginning of the all-volunteer Army, the armed forces have been largely drawn from middle-class volunteers, but that situation seems to be changing. An important question for those interested in the military of the next millennium is the impact of an all-volunteer force drawn mostly from the lower economic strata. While the U.S. Army following the Civil War and World War I was largely composed of recruits drawn from the lower (and thus less educated) classes, a return to such a situation today

would bode ill for the egalitarian premises of American society and the technological demands of the Army After Next.

A gulf between the military and society is one that many paramilitary organizations are eager to fill. Many of these self-styled "militias" have a militant ideology, a strong distrust of federal, state, and local government, and a proclivity toward violence. Most see themselves as elitist and chauvinistic organizations. Many are well-armed, and some have boasted of possession of biological weapons.

While these militias do not now provide a danger to the armed forces, they can be expected to thrive where the military is perceived as not carrying out its mission. To the extent that the military becomes smaller or loses touch with the public, the growth of private, often single-issue, and almost always anti-government groups is possible. The militias pose a further threat of increasing polarization within the military itself.

Since Vietnam, the military has successfully restored high standards of professionalism within the ranks. Cleaning up the drug problem, restoring racial harmony, and the creation of extensive family networks are examples. They have won a large measure of support in society and indeed serve as an important bridge between the uniformed military and the people. These developments have not, however, eliminated strains between our society and our military.

Indeed, strong but misdirected unit loyalties can create a type of polarization posing potential dangers for the armed forces of 2030. With the spread of permissivism in the country, the military may increasingly come to view itself as a "sub-society" with values that are "better" than those of civilian society. This perception may translate into an elitist disdain, viewing the greater society as being at odds with the classic military virtues of sacrifice, self-discipline, and focus upon the interest of the group before that of the individual.⁸ If this process continued, increasing

detachment of the military from the society it serves could reach alarming dimensions.⁹

Complicating the problem is the frequency of highly publicized ethical, moral, and legal transgressions by members of the military, from drill sergeants to generals. Although relatively few in number, even a single instance of dishonorable behavior attracts wide public notice, eroding popular belief in the traditional exemplary standards of conduct among the military.

One result of such scandal can be a siege mentality in which loyalty to the unit is placed above prosecution of the offender, with organizational solidarity becoming the paramount good.¹⁰ This reaction leads to further isolation from the public and—ironically—from the values the services are supposed to represent.

CONCLUSION

Vietnam answered the question of whether American soldiers should be committed to prolonged war without the support of the American public. The answer was a resounding no. A new set of questions now faces the U.S. military—both active duty and reservists—in the post-Cold War world. These questions derive from the broad problem of how to employ reserve forces to accomplish missions in a high-optempo environment, frequently on a sustained basis, while preserving long-term support for both the mission and the military components that carry them out. For example:

At what point in a developing military confrontation should Reserves and National Guard units be mobilized?

For what duration should they be committed in conditions short of declared war?

Should they have a role in homeland defense, particularly in dealing with the threat against the United States posed by weapons of mass destruction?¹¹

The foregoing are sensitive and profoundly important questions. The answers that we as a society provide will go a long way in determining whether the forces that tend to separate the American military from the people it serves will prevail. All national defense policy debate should be tempered by a determination to keep the American soldier and the American people together, for they are, after all, one and the same.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3

1. Richard H. Kohn, "Out of Control, The Crisis in Civil Military Relations," *The National Interest*, Spring 1994, pp. 3-17. Kohn views the officer corp as increasingly conservative (Republican), partisan, and openly critical and at times resentful of civilian control. He identifies President Clinton as the target of a level of disrespect (as a person) by the military not seen in modern times.

2. Gary Hart, *The Minutemen: Restoring the Army of the People*, New York: The Free Press, 1998, chapter 1.

3. Dov Zakheim, "Global Peacekeeping Burden Strains U.S. Capabilities," *Defense News*, April 6-12, 1998, p. 19. Also John G. Roos, "Peacekeeping's Toll, High 'Personnel Tempo' Eroding Readiness on Several Fronts," *Armed Forces Journal International*, March 1998, pp. 18-19; and John Hillen, "Hollow to the Corps, The President Is Relentlessly Shrinking the Armed Forces While Thinking of More and More Things for Them to Do," *National Review*, March 9, 1988, pp. 36, 38-40. For a contrary view, see Thomas G. McInerney and Eric R. Pages, "Bolstering Military Strength by Downsizing the Pentagon," *Issues in Science and Technology*, Winter 1997-98, pp. 1-6.

4. All branches of the military, with the exception of the Marines, are facing recruiting challenges (at this writing). The Army has fallen short of goals, and a growing number of specialty areas from pilots to computer programmers are experiencing acute shortages. Larry Lane, "Role Playing for Bosnia," *Soldiers*, March 1998, pp. 20-21. A major Department of Defense effort entitled "Employer Support for the Guard and Reserve" (ESGR, Source: National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve, 1555 Wilson Blvd., Suite 200, Arlington, VA) has been enacted to encourage civic leaders and employers to give maximum support and eliminate barriers to those who attempt to balance civilian careers with membership in the Guard or Reserve. Jonathan S. Landay, "New Roles for America's Weekend

Warriors," *Christian Science Monitor*, January 6, 1998, pp. 1, 8. This is but one from a litany of writings in this ongoing and strident debate.

5. James Carroll, "An Enemy Within the U.S. Military," *Boston Globe*, November 18, 1997, p. A25; and Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., "The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012," *Parameters*, Winter 1992-93, pp. 2-20.

6. Threats from weapons of mass destruction (WMD), information warfare (also called information operations), and asymmetrical sources are potential "invaders" of a more sinister description, however.

7. These are a few of the many technological goals for *Force XXI Army* and the *Army After Next*, the two central sources that will shape the future of the U.S. military, specifically the Army.

8. Thomas E. Ricks, "The Widening Gap Between the Military and Society," *The Atlantic Monthly*, July 1997, pp. 66-78.

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11. Lisa Burgess, "Initiative Expands Guard's Role in Bio-chem Defense," *Army Times*, April 6, 1998, p. 23. See also Rick Maze, "Guard to Respond to Terror Incidents," *Defense News*, March 2-8, 1998, p. 7; Joseph Douglas, Jr., "A Biological Weapons Threat Worse Than Saddam," *The Wall Street Journal*, March 10, 1998, p. 22; *News From the Front: Domestic Preparedness Against Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)*, U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command, Center for Army Lessons Learned, January-February 1998, pp. 1-4.

CHAPTER 4

THE U.S. ARMY AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Douglas V. Johnson II

To set the stage for the various treatments of contemporary diversity issues contained in the chapters that follow, I shall present a compressed historical *tour d'horizon* of the employment of black and other minority soldiers in the American Army from the Revolutionary period. Admittedly, "diversity" embraces far more than the male experience. Certainly women did sometimes serve in uniform in various capacities, but they were seldom legal and always auxiliary. Therefore, without at all denying the worthwhile contribution of women to national defense over the years, diversity inquiries into the period prior to World War II devolve essentially to ethnicity. In treating this subject, I shall for the sake of historical verisimilitude be using language taken verbatim from the official records. In doing so, I mean, of course, no disrespect to any person or group.

Many readers will recall Crispus Attucks (born 1723?), a black man who became a victim of the Boston Massacre on March 5, 1770. Considerable irony attaches to the fact that, while he was one of the first to die in the struggle for American independence, his freedom would have by no means been assured even after the Revolution. He was not a soldier per se, since there was no Army, but once the killing began in earnest, the criterion for inclusion became—as it usually does in such circumstances—one's willingness to confront the enemy and not much more.

In the New England states, free negroes were initially enrolled without prejudice. That situation did not hold, however, for Congress passed a law forbidding their

reenlistment. That law remained in effect until 1776, when white volunteers got really short again, and the Secretary of War persuaded Congress to repeal the law.¹ Black soldiers were integrated in most units, but in 1778 when a general reorganization took place throughout the Army, Rhode Island consolidated all its black soldiers into one regiment, the first segregated unit I was able to identify. Since we do not know the details of that act, I am not certain "segregated" as we understand the word today is properly descriptive.²

While bigotry toward any group is always to be condemned on its face, there were relatively few problems with ethnicity in the Army in the early decades, at least not in any sense that one could argue plausibly that ethnicity acted against "good order and discipline." Ironically, in the late 1940s, Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall argued against President Truman's order to desegregate the armed forces on the ground that integration would be disruptive of good order and discipline and would thus reduce the combat readiness of the Army as a whole.

In 1976, Robert A. Gross published a study of Minutemen centered on Concord, Massachusetts. In it he notes: "No longer did young men of substance volunteer for common duty in any sizable numbers. The war was now being fought principally by landless younger sons, by the permanent poor and blacks." He continues with the observation that eventually the town of Concord filled eight percent of its quota with blacks. But he also noted that Army service meant freedom for black soldiers; the Army protected former slaves within its ranks, supporting their cause in court against their former owners. Whether it would have continued to do so when the demand for manpower was lower, we can not say from this source.³

With independence won, the country embarked upon its first downsizing of the Army, one that would have reached zero had not several prominent voices intervened. After all, American independence was not truly won until after the

War of 1812. But the Army was reduced to a shadow of its former self—718 officers and enlisted in 1789—never having been particularly large in the first place.⁴ The Army now undertook to protect the frontiers, initially shielding the Indians against voracious, land-grabbing settlers. Ethnicity was not an issue. But those hearty and adventuresome enough to enlist died in the wilderness in depressing numbers.

The Army swelled to 44,736 by the end of the Mexican War in 1847, but only 6 years later it was down to 10,572.⁵ Of these, 8,000 were deployed somewhere—and we think we are overstretched today!⁶

The periodic wars entailing accordian-like troop buildups and subsequent drawdowns, the incredibly harsh and brutal conditions on the frontier, the over-extension of the force, the low pay, and the fanciful rumors of riches to be won in the mountains further west all combined to make it difficult to hang onto the troops we had, much less to recruit new ones. With 4,600 recruits required to fill the ranks in 1853, for example, the Secretary of War in his annual report said, "To obtain these at the prevailing rate of pay, and in the present prosperous state of the country, can scarcely be expected." Sound familiar? Combining the lure of gold in California (reputed to be responsible for 530 desertions), desertions in general were running over 12 percent and taken together with other losses required more than one-third of the entire Army to be recruited every year—one-third!⁷ Is it any wonder, then, that desperate recruiters began to look at heretofore untapped sources of recruit material?

Notice that so far I have not spoken of diversity in any form—the official reports are silent thereupon. But in 1856 there is a curious entry in the Secretary of War's annual report. After detailing the continuation of the 30 percent per annum loss rate, the Secretary states, "Reports show an unusually large proportion of *Americans* among the detachments recently sent to regiments." So the dirty little

secret begins to show its head. Most of the men who had been enlisting in the Army were not Americans. What does that mean?⁸

In 1857 we get a better glimpse of the truth. Rolls showing casualties and decorations from combat with Indians reveal the following names: Kuhn, Strobell, Mueller, Weiss, Zinzenhoffer, Franz—and Rooney, McManus, McKim, Dougherty, Sullivan, Duggan, McCandle, Quinn, O'Donnell, McKay, McEowen.⁹ Americans? Maybe in death, beforehand we cannot tell for certain. They represent substantial minority groupings within the Army of that time, but they had one advantage—if they kept their mouths shut, they were not as easily distinguishable as were soldiers of color.

Service in the Army was one road to American citizenship. In addition, for much of our history, the Army remained a steady employer for those unable to get work elsewhere or for other reasons about which we may speculate endlessly. The old explanation for Irish enlistments was that “the mercurial sons of Erin” were given to poetry and blood by nature, and Army drink was cheap. In fact, ours is one of the few armies in history that did not provide a liquor ration.

This manifestation of diversity had, to this point, caused trouble only once. During the Mexican War, a group of soldiers of Irish descent deserted and joined the Mexican Army, forming what was known as the “San Patricio” Battalion. We do not know the number of deserters in it, but when that battalion was defeated in battle, those identified as deserters were shot as traitors. The reluctance of Irish Catholics to fight Mexican Catholics played a role in the desertions.

How far religion might have come to be a disruptive force was never answered, as the great and tragic Civil War burst upon the nation within the next few years. The complex intermingling of issues of slavery and preservation of the Union is well enough known that we need not enter it here,

but it is in the Civil War that diversity begins to take on increasing importance.

In his 1863 report, the Secretary of War notes the establishment of the "Bureau for Colored Troops," meaning that enough black men had joined the Army to create the need for a separate management office. In his 1864 report the Secretary reported that 58,301 colored troops had been raised from within the rebel states. He noted further that while in October 1863 there had been only 58 colored regiments totalling 37,707 soldiers, by October 1864 the numbers had risen to 140 regiments and 101,950 soldiers, certainly impressive numbers.¹⁰

But there was also a sour note. The Adjutant General noted that when black soldiers were first enlisted, they were frequently consigned to labor duties rather than fighting. He voiced his own strenuous objections thereto and insisted that black soldiers be properly trained as soldiers and employed as such: "The prejudice in the Army against their employment as troops was very great; but now, since the blacks have fully shown their fighting qualities and manliness, it has greatly changed."¹¹

There was a particular situation during the Civil War in which ethnic diversity had a strongly negative effect. The 11th Corps of the Union Army was popularly known as the German Corps, containing many soldiers of Germanic origin who fled Europe following the 1848 revolutions. This corps had the great misfortune to have been thrown into the right of the Union line at the battle of Chancellorsville, where it was a sitting duck for Stonewall Jackson's force. Jackson had marched his troops behind Confederate lines in hopes of finding an unprotected Union right flank. By the time he arrived, the 11th Corps was "protecting" that flank, but it was totally ignorant of its mission or of any enemy to its front or flank. Jackson's attack caught the Corps unaware and drove it from the field as it would have driven any unit so caught. Morale remained intact, and the 11th Corps recovered its balance and reassembled. Then it

marched to Gettysburg. There, once again it was placed on the right of the line. But even though the higher command knew a Confederate division was en route to Gettysburg from the east, no reconnaissance was made, and once again the Confederates slammed into the unprotected right flank of the 11th Corps and drove it from the field.¹² The Army of the Potomac cursed those “damned Germans” liberally and long thereafter. In truth, the Germans in that corps did not fight badly at all, but they were bedevilled by their previous failures, their lack of confidence in their commander, and residual political confusions. There were sharp cleavages between the old European aristocracy and the newly arrived liberals who were ardent supporters of emancipation—a good deal more ardent than most of the Union soldiers whose principal identifiable goal was restoration of the Union.¹³

We will pass over the terribly unhappy period of Reconstruction during which the Army found itself administering the southern states. This experience later resulted in legislation forbidding regular Army personnel from exercising any police powers whatsoever so long as competent civil authority existed.¹⁴

Instead we jump ahead to the 1890's. Not until that period do the records finally begin to reflect the truth of diversity in statistical terms. In the report for 1894, 27,531 people applied for enlistment in the Army. Of these, 7,817 were accepted. Of those accepted, 7,352 were white, 419 colored, 46 Indian. The record also notes that 2,891 of the applicants were of foreign birth. While it does not report all figures, it records that acceptance rates were as follows: white 43.34 percent; colored 44 percent; Indian 74 percent.¹⁵ In the following year's report, the ethnic breakout becomes more detailed, but we discover that the standards for enlistment were made far more stringent:

By the Act of August 1, 1894, enlistments were confined to citizens, or those who declared their intentions to become such,

not over 30 years of age, and able to speak, read and write the English language.

This is the first time those requirements can be found to exist.¹⁶

The ethnic breakout per 1,000 recruits as set forth in the 1895 report is as follows: White, 927; Negro, 67; Indian, 6. ut of the 927 whites, only 608 were "native U.S. citizens." The remaining 319 were composed of such nationalities as Irish, German, English, Canadian, Swedish, Danish, and Austrian, with Irish (95) and German (94) predominating. Thus, about 32 percent of the incoming recruits were non-native-born whites.¹⁷

In the 1896 report we find roughly comparable figures, though it was noted that, for the first time in a decade, the figures for both the Germans and Irish had dropped below 90. The Surgeon General included some interesting medical data, reporting that while the average white soldier lost an average of 12.6 days for illness, the average colored soldier lost only 9.6 days. These figures led him to conclude that "the enlisted men of the colored regiments are apparently less susceptible to most diseases than the whites."¹⁸

In the report for the following year, the white discharge rate (for all nondisciplinary causes) was placed at 35 per thousand, that of Negro soldiers at 26. Disability losses in days per soldier per year were 13 for whites, 9 for Negro soldiers.¹⁹ In addressing alcoholism as a major problem in the Army of the day, the Surgeon General noted that the Army-wide average was 29 per thousand, but among Negro troops it was only 6.²⁰ Though it may be in contravention of received wisdom to say so, black soldiers by this time had clearly established an enviable record of behavior and reliability. Such revelations validate once again the cry of every Ph.D. dissertation advisor: "Go to the primary sources!"

Manifestly, despite the postive notes observed in the foregoing survey, prejudice toward minorities of most any

type has always existed in the Army and most other large institutions. It culminated when General John J. Pershing was forming the American Expeditionary Forces in France in 1917 and 1918. Provided two division equivalents of black soldiers, he refused their services and literally palmed them off on the French. Pershing was adamant that he was going to form an American Army and was not going to give in to Allied appeals for men to provide individual fillers for their units. Americans were going to fight as Americans under American command—except for black units.²¹ The French, who had long experience with black African troops, were delighted to have any soldiers. By and large, these soldiers did as well as any, considering the gross training deficiencies that afflicted the entire force.

It is unfortunate that attitudes like Pershing's continued into World War II. In a reprise of what we saw during the early part of the Civil War, black Americans were relegated in large numbers to stevedore units in the Pacific theater and elsewhere. However, some made it into combat, vindicating President Truman's bold desegregation order after the war. But as General Julius Becton has often noted, even Truman's directive did not result in full integration or effective equality until after the Korean War—and some would argue not until after Vietnam.

As we have observed from the annual Secretary of War reports on recruit acquisitions, ethnic diversity is hardly new to the Army. By and large, the Army has handled such diversity with relative equanimity, focusing primarily upon the ability of soldiers to do their duty regardless of anything else. There have been and will continue to be incidents of bigotry and discrimination. Such is human nature. But there are few places in the world where such acts or even attitudes are as fully and legally proscribed as in the U.S. military.

It will soon be the turn of Hispanics to test the efficacy of those legal proscriptions. In the fall of 1998, the census statisticians announced that Hispanic teenagers were

already the largest American minority group for their age bracket, which will render them a prime object of recruitment efforts in the very near future. Historically, the Army has already experienced two waves of Hispanic enlistments, once during the period after Cuba fell to Castro in 1959, and again when large numbers of Puerto Ricans were drafted for the Vietnam War. If the U.S. Army could win the Civil War in which entire units spoke some language other than English; if it could hold together, barely, when a disproportionate number of its infantry were minority soldiers in Vietnam, its most unpopular war since the War of 1812; if it has been cited again and again, despite its flaws, as the best model of social engineering in this nation's history—then I would hazard to suggest that it will continue to do as well in the future. It will continue to look as much as humanly possible beyond diversity issues. For when it comes down to killing, which is ultimately why armies exist, there is only one question that matters: "Can that soldier be depended upon to do the job?"

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4

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CHAPTER 5

DIVERSITY IN THE 21st CENTURY ARMY: LEADERSHIP ISSUES

Joseph C. Jones

INTRODUCTION

The ethnic makeup of the Army is a concern of military and civilian leaders within the Department of Defense and Congress alike. Based upon Census Bureau population projections, Hispanics will become the largest minority group in the country by 2005, surpassing African Americans. If residents of Puerto Rico are included in the tally, then Hispanics will become the largest minority group even earlier, by the turn of the century in fact. Immigration and fertility rates are indeed changing America's complexion, and such change will inevitably affect ethnic representation in the Army.

This chapter will address Census Bureau demographic projections, Army demographic trends, societal and military implications, and, finally, organizational leadership issues arising from diversity changes in the force of the future. Since my past research has primarily concerned Hispanic representation in the Army, I will draw upon this research in order to highlight that minority group and its possible effect on ethnic representation in the Army of the future.

DEMOGRAPHIC PROJECTIONS

In terms of national demographic projections, the highlights below, providing insights to how America will look in the future, are taken from the Census Bureau's population reports issued in 1996.¹ Specifically, the report indicates that:

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- The white share of the U.S. population (non-Hispanic) will fall from 74 percent in 1995 to 72 percent in 2000, 64 percent in 2020, and 53 percent in 2050.
 - Also by 2050, the black population will rise to 61 million, nearly double what it was in 1995. After 2016, more blacks than non-Hispanic whites will enter the population annually.
 - From today to 2050, less than half of U.S. population growth will occur in combined black and white non-Hispanic populations.
 - The highest rates of increase will be in the Hispanic-origin and the Asian and Pacific Islander populations, with annual growth rates that may exceed 2 percent until 2030.²
 - Annually from now to 2050, the ethnic group adding the largest number to the population will be of Hispanic origin. Moreover, starting in 2020, more Hispanics will be added to the U.S. population each year than all other ethnic groups combined. By 2010, the Hispanic-origin population will become the second largest ethnic group.
 - By 2030, the non-Hispanic white population will constitute less than half of the U.S. population under age 18. But in that year, the non-Hispanic whites will still comprise three-quarters of the 65 and over population.

Inevitably, with such enormous flux in ethnic proportions projected out to the middle of the next century, especially among the under-18 age cohort, the military will be deeply affected.³

SOCIETAL AND MILITARY IMPLICATIONS

Though change is inevitable, the degree of change will be based upon a number of variables. First, the level of assimilation of various ethnic groups into American culture will directly impact the demographic content of the military. If Hispanics, who will become the largest minority group in the near future, embrace the larger culture of American society and assimilate into it, then it will be easier to recruit and retain them in the active force. However, if Hispanics fail to assimilate to a sufficient degree, they will probably not readily enter military service primarily because their language heritage will preclude them from performing well enough to gain entry.⁴

Acculturation—the process of breaking down pluralist group tendencies—was initially forced on Mexican Americans during the 19th century. Since that time, various groups within the Hispanic culture have acculturated to varying degrees. The largest Hispanic population is Mexican Americans, but the Hispanic community is also comprised of people from Cuba, Puerto Rico, and other Central and South American countries. Each of these national groups carries different cultures and traditions from their home countries. The Spanish language is what links these diverse groups together, but to think that all Hispanics are the same is folly. Therefore, the level of acculturation and hence assimilation in the 21st century will be a combination of highly variable inputs.

The level of integration of minority groups into American society can also help explain what the Army's demographic content will become. Similar to acculturation, integration goes one step further by bringing members of the minority group into all aspects of the dominant society, including its political, economic, and cultural institutions. If minorities and immigrants integrate into society at higher rates than at present, then they may participate in military service if this service is perceived as being beneficial.

The Army places a high priority upon training and education, encouraging soldiers to get college credits through evening courses and nontraditional means. Education is seen as a means of advancing through the ranks, since military and civilian education is counted towards promotion points for advancement to sergeant and staff sergeant. This view, consistent with Human Capital Theory, is validated by many minority success stories achieved through individual efforts and education.⁵

The force of the future will have to rely on trained and educated soldiers to accomplish complex, technology-dependent missions. The military already excludes those potential recruits who score in the bottom 10 percent in mental acuity. It considers quality recruits to be those scoring in the upper 50 percent of the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT). As long as the military is able to attract high quality applicants regardless of socio-demographic variables, it will be able to contend with the challenges of increased technology because it will have a force with the mental aptitude to adapt.

A major concern for the future is whether minorities and immigrants will qualify in sufficient numbers for service in the military. While Hispanics today have only about a 50 percent high school graduation rate, the Army requires that no less than 90 percent of recruits have a high school diploma. If the Hispanic high school graduation rate does not increase, a large proportion of this growing pool will find itself ineligible to enlist.

When more Hispanics and other minorities do enter the ranks, the Army must continue to support them by focusing on quality enhancement. English language comprehension looms as the most pressing problem for Hispanics in the Army. The Army can tap into various existing resources to support such soldiers. Through English as a Second Language classes run by Army Community Services and other computer-assisted educational programs presented at Army Education Centers, any immigrant soldier can

achieve language and educational improvement. If the Army is serious about increasing the number of Hispanics in the ranks, such steps are crucial. Minorities and immigrants must not be made to feel like "second class citizens." At no time will the Army's recruitment slogan, "Be All You Can Be," become more relevant than to minority recruits of the 21st century.

As with any profession based on unique skills, it takes time to grow senior officers and NCOs—normally 17 years for a battalion commander or platoon sergeant.⁶ Minorities have done well in attaining the highest ranks of the NCO corps, but they are under-represented at the general officer level. Unlike corporate America, the military does not hire colonels and generals from civilian society. These officers attain the rank through promotions after considerable field experience and commensurate military and civilian education. The Army must begin now to attract and retain more minority officer candidates so that in the 21st century ethnic soldiers will find role models and sources of inspiration among the higher ranks.

INDIVIDUAL LEADERSHIP

The U.S. military moving into the 21st century will be a far more heterogeneous force, capable of executing a complex array of missions and duties. It will be a multicultural organization that appreciates and values the diversity of its soldiers. The multicultural approach differs from a pluralistic design in that we work to increase the level of appreciation for the differences associated with the heritage and values of many different groups.⁷ For example, throughout the year specific months are set aside to recognize the presence and contributions of blacks, Hispanics, and women. The military must value diversity and demonstrate its positive attitude through these and other programs aimed at celebrating and capitalizing upon its diverse force.

Beyond broad institutional programs and initiatives, however, which we shall consider shortly, there is the question of individual leadership by those in positions of authority within the heterogeneous, multicultural, ethnically diverse force of the next century. Following are several suggestions for how to tailor one's leadership approach to the unique demands of the post-millennium Army.

- **Demonstrate Commitment.** Army leaders at all echelons must have a commitment to diversity and equal opportunity, a commitment that actively guides leader conduct and human interactions. Such commitment is the keystone to our entire value structure. Leaders must recognize and accept that the composition of the military is changing in the direction of increased numbers of minorities and women. Leaders must prevent issues of diversity from adversely affecting decisionmaking as they guide the organization toward mission accomplishment. In their zeal to develop organizational cohesiveness, it is important that leaders not forfeit the very real benefits of increased organizational creativity and problem-solving ability derivable from a diversity of cultural inputs.
- **Get Educated.** Americans tend to be ignorant about other societies and even about subcultures within their own society. Leaders should find out as much as possible about the cultural backgrounds of their soldiers. It is wise to use materials (including films, books, newspapers, magazines, plays, songs, poetry, websites, etc.) written by members of a relevant subculture to complement "academic sources." Whether dealing with foreign or domestic cultures, the leader must always keep in mind that he or she is viewing others through a biased cultural lens because of the potential for the existence of ethnocentrism.

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- **Be Open But Don't Go Native.** No one expects leaders to be someone they're not. While showing interest in and warm receptivity to another culture is appreciated, mimicking it is not, and in fact can be insulting. Invitations to cultural gatherings or rituals should be graciously accepted, but as a guest and not a convert lest enthusiasm be mistaken for a patronizing attitude. Leaders should not worry overmuch about making honest mistakes in cultural accommodation so long as their good will and honorable intentions are clear.
 - **Listen.** Americans have a reputation for arrogance and wanting to dictate to others. Get the mission done, but hear what others have to say and be receptive to alternatives. The mission and safety of the troops obviously come first, but there are different ways to "skin a cat," and the leader must never assume that his particular way was blessed by the heavens.
 - **Develop Cultural Awareness.** An important part of organizational cultural awareness training is to get soldiers from the various cultures to honestly share—before the assembled group—their prejudices about different cultures in American society as well as those of foreign countries, especially the ones to which the unit might be deploying. Such public candor may well evoke heated discussion, but so long as the discussion cuts in all directions and is led constructively, the unit benefits. Honest communication is the best antidote to bigotry.
 - **Set Up and Maintain Review Systems.** These should encourage continuous improvement in regard to the leadership of diverse organizations—scrutinizing the organization periodically to unearth new problems and establish plans of action to fix those problems. Such surveys, assisted by focus groups, can

help to identify and track issues of intercultural tolerance and cooperation.

- **Empathize with the Disadvantaged.** No leader can truly understand or appreciate a culture until he or she has considered it through the eyes of women, the poor, or other disenfranchised groups in the society. In reacting to soldiers' breaches of cultural decorum or any other lapse from the desired norm, leaders in a culturally diverse organization would do well to hearken to the ancient canon, "Judge not till you yourself have walked in the sinner's shoes." When a leader forces himself to realize that not all his subordinates have enjoyed his advantages, he can come to view them in an entirely new light.

ORGANIZATIONAL INITIATIVES

The previous section focussed on acts and attitudes of individual leaders, primarily those at the lower echelons who deal directly with soldiers. But it is also necessary for the leaders of large organizations—e.g., an infantry division—to recognize that they too have a vital role to play. The higher commander—through his personal example, articulated priorities, and organizational programs—sets the tone for the entire command. If a high-level commander of an ethnically diverse organization is indifferent to the special problems posed by diversity, we can be absolutely certain that such indifference will soon permeate all the way down to the most junior enlisted leaders.

Following is a broad menu, by no means exhaustive, of measures that senior commanders, acting either directly or through organizational programs, can select to fashion an enlightened command approach to diversity.⁸

- Inform top leaders and those in positions of authority that they need to be fully committed to equal opportunity and appreciation of cultural diversity as

organizational goals; obtain their commitment by whatever means necessary.

- Recognize equal opportunity and cultural diversity as organizational issues and portray them that way to soldiers and officers.
- Assign responsibility for equal opportunity and cultural diversity programs to top leadership.
- Set goals and objectives, measure performance, and employ appropriate incentives exactly as with any other command program.
- Stress the importance of promoting equal opportunity and valuing cultural diversity in the mission statement.
- Set up special committees to advise top leadership on diversity issues.
- Offer training programs in support of equal opportunity and cultural diversity.
- Involve leaders at all levels in the design and implementation of equal opportunity and cultural diversity programs.
- Stress that competence is the first screening criterion for filling open positions.

Such measures as those above, plus others that might be suggested by minority groups themselves within the command, should go a long way toward ensuring a healthy cultural climate. Senior leaders must do more than pay lip service to diversity. They must infuse throughout their organization a realization that diversity is here to stay and that it must be effectively managed rather than simply reacted to.

The Consideration for Others Program originated at the U.S. Military Academy can serve as a useful model for organizations and institutions provided there is sufficient oversight to ensure program objectives are being met.⁹ Already adopted by the Military District of Washington, the Consideration for Others Program holds great promise for inculcating in the Army's collective consciousness a proven blueprint for enlightened progress in resolving diversity issues.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5

1. U.S. Census Bureau, *Current Population Reports—Population Projections of the United States by Age, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1995-2050*; February 1996, p. 1.

2. By way of comparison, the U.S. population has never grown by 2 percent per year, not even at the peak of the Baby Boom era.

3. To gain a better basis for understanding future change, consider the following break-out of ethnic-gender percentages in the 1998 Army. Of male officers, 81.4 percent are white, 10.1 percent black, 3.6 percent Hispanic. Of female officers, 68.6 percent are white, 20.8 percent black, 3.8 percent Hispanic. Thus, among all officers, 79.8 percent are white, 11.5 percent black, 3.6 percent Hispanic. Of male enlisted soldiers, 59.6 percent are white, 26.7 percent black, 7.2 percent Hispanic. Of female enlisted, 40.5 percent are white, 46.8 percent black, 6.0 percent Hispanic. Thus, among all enlisted, 56.7 percent are white, 29.7 percent black, 7.0 percent Hispanic. The foregoing figures were kindly supplied to the author by Dr. Naomi Verdugo, Demographic Unit, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Department of the Army.

4. "Pluralism" describes the situation where groups retain separate identities, culture, and organizational structures.

5. Human Capital Theory, the traditional view of assimilation, interprets success within American society to be a direct result of individual efforts, personal values, personal skills, and education. See Joseph F. Healey, *Race, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class: The Sociology of Group Conflict and Change*, Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press, 1998.

6. Robert H. Scales, Jr., "Roundtable on Future Responses," in *Challenging the United States Symmetrically and Asymmetrically: Can*

America Be Defeated? Lloyd J. Matthews, ed., Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1998, p. 332.

7. Pluralism and multiculturalism are similar to the extent that both apply to groups which retain their original identities, cultures, and language. But multiculturalism also implies a broad mutual effort for the different groups to accept, understand, appreciate, and harmonize with one another.

8. Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership, *Military Leadership Course Guide*, West Point, NY: U.S. Military Academy, 1998, pp. 306-308.

9. For further elaboration upon the Consideration for Others Program, see chapter 9.

CHAPTER 6

SYSTEMATIC PLANNING FOR RAISING THE FUTURE FORCE

Michael J. Stehlik

INTRODUCTION

Will the armed forces of the United States be able to attract and retain the human capital necessary to bring to fruition the forces they are designing for the early 21st century? We shall explore this question primarily through an Army personnel lens focused on America's military and civil societies.

The Army is embarking on a major restructuring endeavor as it seeks to bring Army XXI into existence over the next decade and make the Army After Next (AAN) a reality within a time frame extending out to about 2025. Each of these armies will increasingly rely on technology to dissipate the fog of war and increase the tempo and lethality of combat operations. To manage this change, the Army established the Force XXI process to guide it through the conceptual development, experimentation, and fielding of each of these armies. They are looking at human factors, technology, and organizational structures.

Implicit in the Army's overall restructuring process is the question of whether the Army will be able to attract the people necessary to bring these two armies to fruition despite the fact that little is known about the personnel characteristics required for each. In other words, the Army is taking a "build it and they will come" view of the future engendered by the unimaginable success of the all-volunteer Army epitomized by the DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM romp in 1990-91. But are there trends in American society and national or international

events rendering this personnel assumption increasingly untenable? Is it possible that the splendid success of the all-volunteer force of the past could be followed by ignominious failure on the part of an all-volunteer force in the AAN time period?

Unfortunately, there are several emerging indications in America's civil and military societies that future armies may be increasingly difficult to staff. Moreover, the Army lacks a sensitive prognostic system for providing early warning of future personnel problems, thus increasing chances for disagreeable surprises as critical manning junctures approach.

PERSONNEL STATUS

For the ground service to evolve from today's Army of Excellence through Army XXI to the Army After Next requires leaders who know where we are and where we are going. To establish some terms of reference, let's review how the Army and the other services ended fiscal year 1997 (FY 97) in terms of their personnel status. In FY 97, the Army arguably experienced its most difficult year for enlisted recruiting since FY 79 as it added hundreds of recruiters and millions of dollars to the recruiting effort while lowering enlistment standards and posting the lowest¹ fill of its force structure in almost 20 years. The difficulties encountered are not reserved for the enlisted ranks. Some classes of helicopter pilot losses are running ahead of historical levels. And the Army is not alone in its personnel problems. The Navy's surface ships were undermanned by as much as 25 percent in FY 97, a manning shortage projected to continue until sometime in FY 99 due to critical shortages in highly skilled enlisted sailors.² The Navy was also experiencing enlisted recruiting difficulties in the early part of FY 98. The Air Force is having its own personnel woes as many of its mid-career pilots are choosing to resign. The Air Force predicts that they will be short at least 700 pilots annually through the year 2000.³

THE ECONOMY AND THE CURRENT PERSONNEL CRISIS

Why is the Army specifically, and the services generally, facing such serious personnel problems? Let's explore the most cited reason—the economy. We know that the overall unemployment rate is at its lowest level in almost a quarter of a century and that for 16- to 19-year-olds, the unemployment rate is also at its lowest level since 1990. We also know that the strength of the economy may be attested to by other measures such as the rise in the commodity markets, renewed public confidence, and possibly the civilian-military wage gap. The wage gap represents the percentage increase that would equate cumulative military pay with cumulative civilian pay. From 1982 through 1998, the civilian-military wage gap increased in favor of the civilians every year except two. By 1998, the military would have required a 13.5 percent increase to match their civilian counterparts.⁴

On the other hand, we know that the Army's recruiting problems began in 1994 or earlier when unemployment rates were not remarkably low, when the economy was not as dynamic as today, and when the wage gap was not as wide as it is today. Additionally, the Army successfully recruited in both good and bad economic conditions and over a period of steadily decreasing military wages relative to civilian wages throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. In early FY 97, as the magnitude of the impending enlisted shortfall became apparent, the Army substantially increased the value of educational and enlistment incentives to offset the lure of the civilian economy. But even these substantially higher incentives failed to attract sufficient people onto active duty.

Does the economy offer a sufficient explanation of the current staffing problems? Maybe. However, it is not the only factor that might affect a young American's decision to serve in the military. Let us look at some of the other relevant factors.

TRENDS IN AMERICAN CIVIL SOCIETY

America's aversion to sustaining a large standing army during times of peace is of long standing. One has only to look at the variable size of the Army over time and correlate it with the periods of peace and war to begin to understand the depth of that aversion. There are, however, two exceptions to this pattern: the Cold War and today. During the Cold War, the public was sufficiently convinced that it was "at war" that it was willing to sustain a befitting standing army. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the government has failed to convince the public that there is any credible threat—near or long term—justifying a standing Army of 1.4 million plus people. Does this aversion to a large standing military affect Americans as they consider whether or not to serve in their military? We simply do not know. But since this aversion appears to be part of the American persona, maybe the Army should look more deeply into the matter.

In addition to America's aversion to a large standing army, it is possible that community or selfless service is a waning social attribute. In 1994, the Boy Scouts of America conducted a poll among men and boys who had been selected for *Who's Who*. The results were startling. At the *bottom* of the top ten attributes or activities associated with being a good citizen were those such as "participate in charities" or "volunteer time in the community."⁵ Looking at it slightly differently, Derek Bok in his book, *The State of the Nation*, asserts that Americans appear to be less responsible in fulfilling basic civic obligations.⁶ Others find today's society to be at odds with the military values of sacrifice, unity, self-discipline, and teamwork.⁷ Still others assert that not serving in the military was the moral thing to do once the all-volunteer Force was created in 1973.⁸

Michael Sandel in *Democracy's Discontent* asserts, "At a time when democratic ideals seem ascendant abroad, there is reason to wonder whether we have lost possession of them at home. Our public life is rife with discontent. Americans

do not believe they have much say in how they are governed and do not trust the government to do the right thing.”⁹ Samuel Huntington in *The Erosion of American National Interests* suggests that rising opposition to the federal government may be a consequence of the end of the Cold War.¹⁰ The Boy Scouts of America’s survey affirms that males are dissatisfied with American society.¹¹ Military service requires a family’s most precious resource—its children. Is it possible that parents, increasingly discontented with their government and society, are loath to surrender their children to military service?

In addition to a diminishing desire to serve, another fading attribute in our postmodern society could be loyalty to the “nation-state.” Samuel Huntington writes that the process of “Americanization and assimilation” characterizing past immigration has changed. Now there is a distinct trend in which immigrants seek to retain their national identities, in some cases retaining their ethnicity as their defining characteristic. America may increasingly become a multicultural regime where the melting pot ideal is discarded and subnational issues dominate the political landscape.¹²

Another daunting hurdle for future recruitment may be the impact of technology on jobs, combined with steadily increasing college graduate wage premiums as technology drives up the cost of the human capital necessary to bring the AAN into being. In such a process, several factors come into play. First, information technologies are now reshaping the workplace through such innovations as intelligent tools. Intelligent tools increase the skill prerequisites of workers, increase their effectiveness, and drive up their salaries. The higher salaries strengthen the inducement of high school graduates to attend college so as to qualify for the technologically-based, higher-salaried positions becoming available, thereby siphoning off young people who might otherwise have been candidates for enlistment in the services. If the services are to compete successfully, they

must be prepared to pay more since manpower has been made more expensive.¹³

Second, the economic benefit of military service relative to college followed by civilian employment is continuing to fall further behind, indicating that the Army may not be competing effectively enough.¹⁴ While the wage premium for those with 1-3 years of college has remained relatively constant, those with a 4-year degree have seen their wages grow from 140 percent to almost 160 percent of the wages of people with only a high school diploma.¹⁵ RAND research into recruiting indicates that there has been a substantial drop in the numbers of students taking the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) from 1988 through 1994. Additionally, the number of seniors taking the ASVAB has also dropped substantially.¹⁶ Since taking the battery, a prerequisite to joining a service, is voluntary, the numbers taking it provide a good barometer of recruiting prospects.

How might these trends combine to affect the Army's ability to bring the AAN force to fruition in 2025? First, it seems likely that there will be a dilution of certain job skill prerequisites in the AAN force owing to the proliferation of smart machines. But it also seems likely that other intelligent but technologically challenging tools will be in abundance, thus requiring quality soldiers to use them effectively.¹⁷ This bifurcation of jobs and skills in the military will also permeate the civilian market. Consequently, both the Army and civilian employers will need and seek the same two quality groups among employees.¹⁸

Moreover, there is research indicating that the increasing college wage premium may actually be leaving the Army a lower-quality pool of applicants from which to recruit, since high-quality youth who previously enlisted in the Army are now attending college.¹⁹ The lower ASVAB test rates for seniors may indicate that they are sold on college as the ticket to success. Further, their parents may

be more sold on college and less enthusiastic about military service as they consider the broad array of attractive options available to their children.²⁰ Cumulatively, then, the pool of quality personnel will increasingly be pursued by both the Army and other institutions. However, the growth of economic incentives offered by the civil sector indicates that the Army may have an increasingly difficult time luring those people onto active duty.

Even as the impact of technology appears likely to drive both the military and civilian organizations to seek the same qualified people over the next quarter of a century, there may be other educational trends that will further increase the competition for quality people. Specifically, despite the fact that college attendance is increasing, there is evidence that proficiency levels among both college and noncollege bound youth are *not* increasing. More important, though, there may be more "inequality" in the quality youth market than traditional statistics indicate.²¹ Consequently, the previously discussed competition for quality youth may in fact take place within a smaller pool of "quality youth" acceptable to the military, civilian employers, and colleges. If so, given the previous discussion of technology and jobs, the Army will face even stiffer competition for the high-quality youth necessary to man the AAN.

The last civil trend that may bear on military service is that associated with values and morals. Clausewitz in *On War* notes that the moral domain is among the most important in war. But in American society, moral elements necessary to a successful Army may be disappearing. For example, the Boy Scouts of America survey alluded to earlier concluded that "such values as citizenship, patriotism, or social responsibility are assigned considerably less importance by teens aged 14-19 than by younger boys."²² With regard to older males, the survey concluded that "the ethical and moral values of many men fall short of the ideal and reflect a degree of cynicism about society."²³ The military is an organization where success on the battlefield demands acknowledgement of and

adherence to the very ideals that seem increasingly to be discounted in the pool from which soldiers will be drawn. What are the implications for the military of declining moral stock among the population? In the near term, the Marines extended and toughened their boot camp, but even this step may not be enough.²⁴ In the long term, we simply do not know.

Another indicator of the state of moral values is the crime rate. How does the youth crime rate affect the Army's ability to recruit today? In 2025? Recently, there has been considerable press discussion regarding the falling crime rate.²⁵ Others, however, suggest that this development is really the lull before the storm. Even though the nation's crime rate has leveled off, the level of crime is still well above historical levels and remains alarming. Crime victimized nearly 42 million Americans in 1994—31 million property crimes and 10.8 million violent crimes. Most of these crimes were committed by men under the age of 25, usually rendering the perpetrators ineligible for military service.²⁶ Will the Army continue to obtain enough qualified minorities when the crime statistics are projected across racial lines?

TRENDS IN AMERICAN MILITARY SOCIETY

We have discussed a number of trends in America's civil society as they might affect the Army's ability to bring the AAN into being circa 2025. But there are trends in America's military society itself that also may affect the Army's ability to field AAN.

As mentioned earlier, the civilian-military wage gap currently stands at 13.5 percent, but even this stark difference does not capture fully the economic opportunity cost to military couples. Increasingly, working wives have become the norm in America, but military wives bear a heavy economic opportunity cost because the position or location of their soldier husbands often prevents them from working at all or prevents them from developing stable,

lucrative careers when they can work. This cost is estimated as being up to 35 percent of a lieutenant colonel's retired pay.²⁷ Thus, if the current civilian-military wage gap computation were to include the lost economic opportunity cost of military spouses, the wage gap would increase by a significant margin. Making this economic situation even more ominous for future military staffing is the fact that over 56 percent of the enlisted force and over 70 percent of the officer corps had or has a father who served in the military.²⁷ Therefore, if the serving military becomes bearish on military service, it could become even more difficult for the Army to recruit its future AAN force. After all, fathers do counsel sons.

Charles Moskos contends that the decline of military service as a gate for those bound for elite positions in society—such as it was after World War II and the Korean War—is the most important reason for the widening gap between the military and the society it serves. Further estrangement is adumbrated by the comparative lack of military service within the current administration and Congress.²⁹ What is the impact on society when its elite does not serve? We cannot trace out all the ramifications here, but we know a priori that if talented young men and women believe military service is irrelevant to their subsequent prospects for entry into the nation's social and economic elite, then they will be much more prone to avoid it.

In summary, it appears that there may be important social, economic, and moral trends affecting young Americans as they consider whether to serve or not. The most problematic eventuality appears to be that the Army, colleges, and civilian employers will be actively pursuing the same, and possibly dwindling, group of youth with high technological aptitude. Also boding ill for the AAN is the waning of civic responsibility and the rise of a multicultural society in lieu of the traditional melting pot. The Army's knowledge of many of these trends is limited at best. Obviously, with so much uncertainty about the future availability of personnel, there is work to be done.

GETTING A HANDLE ON THE FACTS

If the Army had a rigorous, methodical process by which the “fog” of the future personnel situation could be dissipated, then the task of bringing the AAN force to fruition would not be as difficult. The Army does have a long-range planning document called The Army Plan (TAP). However, TAP is not an appropriate mechanism for attending to the various imponderables. However, the Army does have a proven systematic process that is specifically designed to remove, or at least thin, the “fog” of uncertainty in a tactical context. It is called the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB). Fortunately, the analytical process embodied in the IPB applies to the preparations for solving any complex problem where numerous data inputs must be successfully accounted for. Let us see how it can help us in understanding and solving the problem of staffing the AAN.

The IPB is a *systematic, continuous process* of analyzing the threat and environment in a specific geographic area as it affects military operations. Specifically, the IPB

- Identifies facts and assumptions about the battlefield environment and the threat. This enables staff planning and the development of courses of action.
- Provides the basis for intelligence direction and synchronization that supports the command’s chosen course of action.
- Contributes to complete staff synchronization and the successful completion of several other staff processes.³⁰

The intelligence estimate is completed before any of the other estimates are completed. It provides the facts and assumptions driving all other estimates. The product of the IPB is the basis of the intelligence estimate. The IPB process identifies critical gaps in the command’s knowledge of the battlefield. The commander, using the IPB process,

identifies the initial intelligence requirements. The command's collection manager uses the results of the IPB to develop and implement a collection plan satisfying the commander's priority intelligence requirements. The event template identifies where an activity will occur. The event matrix describes the indicators associated with each activity. Finally, the intelligence synchronization matrix depicts the collection strategy that supports the command's chosen course of action. The collection manager assigns specific responsibility to one or more organizations to monitor one or more areas of interest.

Intelligence synchronization is more than simply ensuring that collection systems of various sorts are operating. The collection manager directs the activities of organizations and intelligence systems, receives the information they produce, processes it, and then packages and disseminates intelligence of value to the commander in time to support his decisions.

ADAPTING IPB IN SUPPORT OF A PERSONNEL SYNCHRONIZATION PLAN

Intelligence synchronization provides a framework for understanding disparate data. If it could be applied to the problem of future personnel, then it could go a long way toward removing the element of contingency that suffuses all discussion thus far. Moreover, it is the synchronization of the data that will identify which trends or developments are relevant and those that are not. To use intelligence synchronization as a model for studying personnel requires that we identify relevant areas of interest (RAIs) and decision points. There appear to be five broad RAIs applicable to our problem: (1) popular aversion to a standing Army; (2) willingness to serve; (3) economic factors; (4) military isolation; and, (5) moral, physical, and cognitive attributes of society.

The first RAI—popular aversion to a large standing army in peacetime—seeks to measure the impact of

America's historical antimilitarism upon the assent of society in undertaking the necessities to provide the necessary personnel for a viable force.

The second RAI—willingness to serve—is directed to the potential recruit rather than to society as a whole. This measure may have generally been supplied by the Youth Attitude Tracking Survey (YATS), but measuring “willingness to serve” is actually far more complicated than simply tapping into individual attitude. Willingness to serve could also be affected, for example, by such macro trends as the weakening of the melting pot ideal.³¹

RAI (3) encompasses all economic factors that might bear on a youth's decision to serve in the military. It would measure the relative economic advantage (or disadvantage) at discrete future years of civilian employment immediately following high school, military service, and college. This measure should be nuanced enough to measure the difficulty of luring quality people onto active duty from year to year. Additionally, the measure should address the economic cost to parents of their offspring's college attendance in light of contributions that could be made by institutions other than the Army. This RAI would also factor in the size of the youth cohort, demand by civilian employers, unemployment levels, and military economic incentives (bonuses, money for college, retirement benefits, etc.).

Military isolationism, the fourth RAI, seeks to assess the impact on military recruitment and retention of the weakening bonds of unity and common cause between the military and the society it serves. This measure should address, among other things, how favorably serving military personnel view military service. Given the large portion of the force that had fathers in the military, a negative view of military service by serving personnel could be extremely detrimental to the Army's recruiting and retention efforts.

Finally, with regard to RAI (5), the moral, physical, and educational attributes of society should be examined with particular attention to how these will shape the raw material of the recruitment pool. Such measurement should lead to refinements in the focus of recruiting efforts, adjustments of enlistment criteria, changes in training programs, and other adaptations to the realities of quality in the recruitment pool. The measurements reflected in these RAIs should be linked to the relevant decision points portrayed on a planning time-line out to the year 2025.

The first decision point would address strategies for recruitment from the age cohort of 17-21 years. The Recruiting Command and a number of research organizations actively study this group. The second decision point would aim at youth cohorts from elementary to high school. It may be reasonable to split this group in two, since research indicates that children older than 12 respond in a markedly different manner to TV than those younger than 12. The last decision point would address cohorts of those as yet unborn or not in school. At first blush it appear ridiculous to consider this last group. However, the Army is building a force over 25 years into the future, one predicated on the twin assumptions that we will field enabling leap-ahead technology and that we will find technologically qualified soldiers to operate it. To make those assumptions valid, we must plan at least 25 years ahead.

Lastly, to capitalize upon a Personnel Synchronization Plan requires that the Army appoint a data collection manager. Although there may be a number of organizations that could perform this role, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (ODCSPER) is an appropriate organization to take on this responsibility.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The most often cited reason for personnel shortages among the services is our robust economy. Upon closer inspection, however, we find that there are emergent trends

in our society and culture that over the long term could exercise even more decisive negative effects upon recruitment. The Army does not have an institutionalized mechanism for adjusting to such trends in a holistic process. Without such a mechanism, bringing the AAN to a successful result will be distinctly problematic. The suggested Personnel Synchronization Plan is a systematic process the Army could use to assess the impact of the many relevant social, cultural, and economic trends affecting the various age cohorts insofar as their willingness to be recruited is concerned.

It is therefore recommended that the Army undertake the following steps.

- Appoint a data collection manager. ODCSPER is one logical candidate, and the Director of Personnel Technologies may be the logical executive agent.
- Implement an integrated process to synchronize use of future personnel intelligence. A Personnel Synchronization Plan (PSP), focusing on the five relevant areas of interest, is one such process whose concepts are generally familiar within the Army.
- The collection manager should identify which organizations can and should monitor each named area of interest and then assign them the responsibility to do so.
- The collection manager should publish, probably quadrennially, a document describing the future situational data for personnel. R&D planners, force developers, and training designers would employ this data in the prosecution of their responsibilities.

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CHAPTER 7

THE HISPANIC MARKET: AN OVERVIEW

Ricardo F. Diaz

INTRODUCTION

This chapter discusses the Hispanic market component of the United States Army Recruiting Command's (USAREC) FY 1999 Marketing Plan, in the process highlighting some of the Hispanic attributes and behaviors that influence their decision to join the United States Army. The focus is on the strategies to be followed in the national market.¹

Hispanics are the fastest growing population component in the United States and are projected to become the largest minority by year 2010. It is in the best interest of the armed services to learn the demographic issues associated with this shift in the U.S. population and the impact of recruiting from this group of youth.

WHO ARE THE HISPANICS?

The first problem is the definition itself. Hispanics are those who identify themselves as being of Spanish origin, regardless of race. There are, of course, individuals who have chosen not to be identified as Hispanics even though they otherwise would be considered as being of Hispanic ethnicity. Hispanics can also be identified as a grouping of ethnicities with a common Spanish language background. The five major groups of Hispanics are Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Central and South American, and all others. Other problems with accurate classification of Hispanics derive from the reporting procedures themselves. For many years Hispanics were grouped as "others" in many of the forms used by the government. It was not until recently that

Hispanics attained their own "block" as an ethnicity in many of the reporting forms.

The 1998 edition of the *Yankelovich Hispanic Monitor* reports that Mexico is the leading country of origin for Hispanics in the United States, with 64.2 percent of all Hispanics. Central and South America are second, with an estimated 21.3 percent, followed by Puerto Rico with 10.4 percent, and Cuba and others with 4.1 percent. "Others" refers primarily to persons whose origin is one of the other Caribbean islands. However, it can also refer to any other Hispanic ethnicity not covered under the four major countries of origin.

MARKET LOCATION

Hispanics, like many other ethnic minorities, tend to concentrate in major metropolitan areas. Hispanics also tend to remain for a good while close to the ports of entry into the United States. The already established Hispanic communities in such cities as Miami can provide sources of employment and support to newcomers as well as sharing a common language.

Information obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau indicates that Hispanics of Mexican origin tend to remain close to the border states of California and Texas. Hispanics of Puerto Rican origin are primarily located in New York City and the northeastern United States, while Hispanics of Cuban origin concentrate in the Miami and Central and South Florida areas. Hispanics of Central and South American origin are primarily in the Miami area, but have also migrated to New York City as well as Los Angeles. Hispanic communities have been gradually established throughout the United States in some of the other large cities such as Chicago, Kansas City, and Seattle.

Recruitment advertising directed at Hispanics on a national basis fails to achieve identification with the separate groups and thus cannot accomplish much more

than promoting the Army's image in a general way. Marketing and advertising directed at the Hispanic community are more effectively communicated by using geo-clustering techniques that will account for nationalities of origin and their particular language colloquialisms as well as cultural and social differences within the various Hispanic communities.

A large proportion of the Hispanic population (80 percent) is concentrated in only 10 of the country's 24 recruiting battalion areas. Ninety-five percent of USAREC's Hispanic recruitment comes from only 12 of the recruiting battalion areas. These 12 are San Antonio, Los Angeles, Phoenix, New York City, Southern California, Miami (to include Puerto Rico), Houston, Sacramento, Dallas, Tampa, Denver, and Chicago. Concentration on these few areas produces the most bang for the buck.

DEMOGRAPHICS

Hispanic youth now comprise approximately 13 percent of USAREC's prime market (males aged 17 to 21), and this share will grow rapidly. Hispanics have the traditional view of "The American Dream." Hispanic immigration, just like that of others, is driven by the quest for opportunity. The opportunity being sought is not only financial, but also educational and social, if not for the adults then for the children.

However, information obtained from the Department of Labor indicates that Hispanics tend to cluster in blue-collar or low-paying white-collar occupations. Hispanics are also nearly twice as likely as whites to be unemployed. They come from a larger-than-average household, with lower-than-average household income. Data from the U.S. Census Bureau indicate that the rate of Hispanics living below the poverty level was 30.3 percent in 1995 and 29.4 percent in 1996. These figures are the highest of any ethnicity. A number of factors—inadequate English, less education, and lack of proper training, among others—can

explain the Hispanic shortcomings in the standard of living. The data also suggest that as children become older, they are required to join the work force in lower-paying jobs to assist in the sustenance of the family rather than pursue higher education. Sadly, it has proved very difficult for Hispanics to break this self-perpetuating cycle.

In the 1997 edition of the *Yankelovich Monitor*, participants were asked to identify the best way for the young to get ahead. Hispanics responded that going to college was the best method. However, in a 1996 study, the National Center for Educational Statistics (NCES) established that Hispanics had the lowest expectation among the main ethnic groups of attaining a baccalaureate degree. Related studies by the NCES have established that Hispanics also have the highest high school dropout rate (30-35 percent). In an NCES study of Hispanic students entering the eighth grade in 1988, it was found that by 1994 only 72.7 percent had managed to obtain a high school diploma and 5.9 percent a GED; 1.4 percent were still enrolled in high school, 5.7 percent were working towards high school equivalency diplomas, and 14.3 percent were complete dropouts. Though the dropout rate did not reach the 30-35 percent level mentioned above, Hispanics still had the highest complete dropout rate among any of the ethnic groups in this particular study.

Moreover, NCES found that only 53 percent of Hispanic high school graduates were qualified for admission to a 4-year institution. The qualification index used was based on such factors as grade point average, senior class rank, SAT and ACT scores, and curricular rigor. It is thus no surprise to read of NCES's finding in 1998 that Hispanics were completing bachelor's degrees only 32.4 percent of the time, and that 36.6 percent of Hispanic students were dropping out of college without any degree at all. The reasons most often cited for these discouraging results are lack of financial resources and family obligations.

Such statistics would seem to indicate that Hispanics have not yet achieved the "American Dream." Though education has been identified as the key to getting ahead, Hispanics have the lowest educational achievement statistics among any ethnicity. Fortunately, the Army offers one of the best packages of educational opportunities of any employer in the country. In view of the Army College Fund and college loan repayment assistance, as well as educational opportunities while in service through the Army Education Centers, it would seem that the Army is the right choice for many Hispanics looking to get ahead. However, the truth of the matter is that because of the restrictions contained in some of the incentives, and the low educational attainment of Hispanic youth as a cohort, many would not qualify for these otherwise very attractive incentives.

WHAT DO HISPANICS WANT?

We have already mentioned that Hispanics have the traditional view of the "American Dream." However, Hispanics remain firmly attached to their family roots. According to the 1998 *Yankelovich Monitor*, the biggest sources of satisfaction for Hispanics after family and home are the acquisition of prestigious brand-name products and shopping in general. More specifically, Hispanic needs and priorities are categorized as follows:

- **Retro-acculturation.** Hispanics are in a constant internal balancing act between maintaining their own cultural roots and assimilating into the American mainstream. Hispanics wish to maintain their Hispanic earmarks and are proud of their Hispanic background. For the most part, they want to participate in Hispanic heritage activities, and they feel the need to maintain ethnic allegiance. But at the same time, Hispanics have the desire to assimilate and achieve success. Most Hispanics agree that immigrants should learn English and accept the

American way of life. They also believe that it is important to be accepted by non-Hispanics.

- **Name-brand Leadership.** A marker for economic and social success is perceived as the ability to acquire “brand” items. Generic products are considered to be lower in quality, acquired only by those who have not yet “made it.” The ownership of name-brand products is seen as an objective testament that the person or family who owns them is advancing and getting ahead in American society.
- **Shopping Enjoyment.** Another voucher of success is having the wherewithal to examine all the shopping options and decide which is the smart value. No longer is the family forced to acquire the cheapest and lowest quality item, for now, as the family progresses up the achievement ladder, it can elect the product most accordant with its aspirations and chosen lifestyle.
- **Technology Empowerment.** Finally, Hispanics feel that technology, as an extension of education, is the marker of future success. Many Hispanics in the United States are immigrants from third world countries where very limited technological resources were available to the population. Now that they are in the United States—the very cradle of technological prowess—they view their ability to obtain and enjoy the fruits of modern technological advancement to be a form of empowerment and status.

HOW CAN RECRUITERS CAPITALIZE UPON THESE WANTS?

In our effort to recruit in the Hispanic communities, we must portray Army service as a way of enabling Hispanics to achieve their goals while serving the country. There are at least two significant Hispanic needs that must be satisfied if the Army is to be successful in this market.

First, the Army must demonstrate that it is family friendly. The Hispanic soldier must feel that his family will be provided for and that his desire to be stationed close to his extended family will be respected to the maximum possible extent consistent with the needs of the Army. Recruiters must participate in Hispanic community activities to show reciprocal acceptance. Recruiters have the challenge not only of recruiting Hispanic youth, but also of recruiting the parents, especially the mother, convincing them of why their son or daughter is better off joining the Army than remaining at home. One of the ways to win over the parents is by promoting the Army as a place to achieve personal ambitions and acquire needed skills. The youth is thus provided the opportunity to prepare for and be successful in life. Army service also makes leaders out of soldiers, a trait (brand leadership) that will distinguish former soldiers throughout their lives. Finally, recruiters must reinforce the Hispanic values of patriotism, duty, and work. By affirming the Army's high and noble standards, recruiters sell the exclusivity of the institution. The uniforms, equipment, and mission accentuate becoming part of an American institution that signifies the best of what America has to offer.

Second, the Army must be perceived as a smart value. The Army must become a source of pleasure, excitement, and social connections. It must also provide a comfortable living for the family. But most important, the Army must provide opportunities for future success, such as high technology training that produces transferable skills. For a youth to commit to a term in service, there must be a demonstrated advantage over time spent elsewhere. Finally, for those youths who have wandered without clear direction, the Army must provide them the opportunity to make up for the lost time and never-acquired technological skills and education.

TRAITS OF THE HISPANIC MARKET

Hispanics have the highest tendency to join the service among any of the ethnic groups. As of September 1997, Hispanic males in the 16-to-21 age group indicated a positive propensity for active Army service of about 18 percent, compared to 16 percent for blacks and 8 percent for whites.²

The 1997 Youth Attitude Tracking Survey (YATS) identifies certain values that set Hispanics apart from the general population in terms of response rates:

- Money for Education
- Parents' Approval
- Staying Near Family And Friends
- Working In Hi-Tech Environment
- Opportunity To Travel

The survey thus reinforces other reports of the high priority on education among the Hispanics. It also confirms the importance to Hispanics of family and high technology jobs. The New Recruit Survey also confirms that Hispanics are subject to relatively more parental influence in the enlistment decision. In a similar vein, the 1997 YATS indicates that Hispanics are less fearful of basic training but identify "family obligation" as a barrier to enlistment at higher rates than the general population.

With regard to Hispanic performance on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT), it has proved somewhat disappointing thus far. The AFQT results show that only 47.2 percent of Hispanics fall into Test Score Categories I-III A, which would qualify them for better incentives and enlistment options. By way of comparison, 67.4 percent of Army recruits in FY 1998 scored in that bracket.³ Puerto Ricans have scored significantly lower on the AFQT than

other Hispanics, and lower in English competency as well. Thus, though the Army provides opportunities that are highly attractive to the Hispanic community, due to low educational attainment many Hispanic youths do not qualify for them.

SIZE OF THE HISPANIC MARKET

According to Census Bureau estimates, there are 2.7 million Hispanic youths 17-21 years old. The number of males in this group is estimated at 1.4 million. The fact that Hispanics have higher high school dropout rates and lower AFQT averages than the general population explains why they qualify for enlistment in the Army at lower rates than the general population. Preliminary studies by the Recruiting Command estimate that the number of qualified Test Score Category I-III A Hispanic males in the 17-to-21 population in the United States is 171,144. From this number, based on propensity-to-enlist surveys, we expect 42,444 to be potentially available. In FY 1998, 21,000 Hispanics were successfully recruited by the services as a whole, of which 7,450, or 35.5 percent, enlisted in the Army.

GROWTH TRENDS

If all the services are currently recruiting some 21,000 Hispanic youths, then there remains a market of 21,000-plus individuals who are potentially interested but are not enlisting in any of the services. We have to recognize that these individuals may not be enlisting because of the high quality of their records and the consequent lucrative opportunities available to them in the private sector. There may also be other factors discouraging these individuals from enlisting that are not detected in any of the surveys.

The Hispanic market is indisputably the fastest growing population segment in the United States. However, for the reasons we have seen, the services may not be able to depend solely on population growth as a source of additional enlistees for the next decade. For Hispanics to be a

dependable source of quality recruits, the Army and the other services must actively involve themselves in the educational remediation of these youths.

TELEVISION AND MUSIC AS RECRUITING TOOLS

According to the 1996 Teenage Research Unlimited study, Hispanic teens, like the general market, watch TV as the biggest leisure time activity. Additionally, listening to music is very popular, but the Hispanic taste in music is more diversified than that of other ethnicities. Hispanic teens prefer alternative, rap, rhythm and blues/soul, and Top 40 in that order.

A study conducted by the Nielsen and Roslow Research Project in 1995 concluded that 83 percent of Hispanics watched Spanish TV and could recall TV commercials 40 percent more accurately if they saw them in Spanish rather than English. Advertising the Army to Hispanics in Spanish is thus far more effective than in English. Also to be considered is that Hispanic parents may not have the same command of the English language as their children. If these same parents are, in fact, major influencers, then Spanish-language TV commercials would be able to reach them much more effectively than those in English.

CONCLUSIONS

The Hispanic market is experiencing the fastest increase in population, but it may be overstated because of disqualifiers that prevent Hispanic youths from entering the service. From a recruiting viewpoint, raising the educational achievement of ethnic minorities thus becomes all-important. Collectively, we need to reach into schools earlier and encourage young people to stay in school and take stronger college preparation programs.

The labor and educational statistics would seem to indicate that Hispanics have not yet achieved the "American Dream." Lack of educational attainment is

preventing Hispanics from qualifying for some of the most desirable enlistment benefits and job opportunities. The Army must revisit some of its definitions of quality as applied to trainability and retention to ensure that we are in fact measuring the right attributes and not limiting enlistment opportunities for the Hispanic community unnecessarily.

USAREC itself must undertake initiatives that will enable us to expand our reach into the rapidly growing Hispanic youth cohort. It must implement a targeted effort to reach the Hispanic community in terms of selling and explaining the product, increasing advertising exposure, and reaching out to the community.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 7

1. Other than estimating the location of the Hispanic youth market in reference to USAREC's recruiting battalions and the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) tester database for calculating Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) projections, the discussion in this chapter usually applies only to Hispanics located within the continental United States, excluding data from Puerto Rico.

2. "Army Demographics" (Working Draft), Headquarters, Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Human Resources Directorate, dated April 6, 1998.

3. United States Army Recruiting Command, "Accession Demographics (Includes Prior Service)," June 1, 1998, p. 1.

CHAPTER 8

WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY

Myra J. Peterson

Despite the rapid growth in some ethnic segments of the U.S. population, the female segment truly hasn't changed much at all in terms of its size, nor is there expected to be any significant shift in the near future. Women have composed about 50 percent of the population right from the beginning and have remained that proportion with remarkable steadfastness. Even following wars and famine, the gender balance returns to even with remarkably little influence or attention on anyone's part.

In this chapter, I'm going to discuss the changes in the Army over the past 25 years and then draw some conclusions about what these shifts might presage for the next 25 or so years. With regard to the demographic composition of the U.S. Army in the year 2030, the best way to look at where we're headed is to see how far we've come and note where we are now.

This examination could not occur at a more opportune time. It happens that in July 1998 the U.S. Army celebrated the 25th Anniversary of the All-Volunteer Army and, in June 1998, the 50th Anniversary of the integration of the armed services. These are two key events in our military heritage that I shall discuss.

We are undeniably the best equipped, best trained, and best prepared fighting force in the world today. But we will be able to maintain that status only if we continue to recruit, train, and retain soldiers of the same high quality.

In 1948, President Truman signed Executive Orders 99-80 and 99-81 which laid the foundation for fair and equal treatment in the armed forces as we know it today. The first

order opened the ranks to women, while the second cleared the way for integration of our black Americans. There are amazing parallels in the achievement of rights for African Americans and for women. Both have suffered from societal attitudes which suggested that their worth was somehow lessened by their race or gender. But the Army has served as the frontier for change in terms of its embrace of policies that support equal opportunity, equal pay, and equal rights. There is still uncharted ground ahead, but the Army has a rich history of pioneering social change for the betterment of our nation at large.

In fact, the year 1973 marked the beginning of an unprecedented concept in service. The last man was drafted in December 1972 and reported for training in June 1973. All soldiers who entered active service since this date did so because they wanted to. No longer were young men subject to the draft and mandatory conscription. The benefits deriving from this change have enabled our force to develop into the strong, cohesive, effective fighting force that can claim victory in the Cold War as its legacy. The Army fields the highest quality force in its history owing to the gains brought about by an all-volunteer force—and the underlying success of the all-volunteer force rests with the inclusion of women.

Once the Army acknowledged that they needed women, they had to decide how to use them. In that evaluation, the overriding issue was not cost-effectiveness but combat effectiveness. In that context, other factors came into play. First, women tend to be physically weaker than men, which limits some of the work they can do; second, women were excluded by law or policy from combat units and positions calling for combat skills. These two factors reduced utilization and assignment flexibility.

The tradeoff in the recruiting market of the early 1970s was thus between a high quality female and a low quality male. Within this tradeoff, the average woman available to be recruited is smaller, weighs less, and is physically

weaker than the vast majority of male recruits. And yet she is brighter, better educated (a high school graduate), scores higher on the aptitude tests, and is less likely to become a disciplinary problem.

To phrase the question bluntly: Is recruiting a male high school dropout in preference to a smaller, weaker, but higher quality female erring on the side of national security in view of the kinds of jobs which must be done in today's military? The answer to that question is central to the decision on how many women should be used in the various services. Sometimes the answer will be yes, and sometimes it will be no, but the question continues to be relevant.

Wars are seen as embodying the very worst behavior of humanity. They reflect our intolerance for others and our desire to improve our own situation at the expense of others. Wars are made in the name of religion, in the name of liberty, and in the defense of the rights and values we hold dear and feel are threatened by another society. War happens because people find themselves in circumstances in which they would rather die than tolerate. Paradoxically, war can produce some positive results.

For example, war and the GI Bill seem necessary to get males through college. In 1940, only 6.9 percent of young males had bachelor's degrees. This percentage continued to rise until 1976 when it reached a peak of 27.5 percent and then dropped to 22.3 percent by 1987. The rate recovered gradually to 22.5 in 1994 and jumped to 26.3 by 1997. Note that the 1997 rate is still below the rate of 27.5 percent reached two decades earlier, following the end of the Vietnam War.

Many of the advances in our society are tied to the presence of women in public. The proportion of females ages 25 to 29 years old with at least a bachelor's degree has shown huge and continuing growth since 1940. This pattern of year-to-year record-setting gains is almost unbroken. The percentage of females 25-29 having at least a bachelor's degree rose from 4.9 percent in 1940 to 29.3 percent by 1997.

The increases since 1994 have been particularly striking, from 24.0 to 29.3 percent in just 3 years, which is the fastest rate of growth at any time in the last six decades.

The steady gains of young women have carried them past the slow progress of young men. In 1991 the proportion of females with bachelor's degrees passed the rate for males for the first time. By 1997 the women were three percentage points ahead of the males and pulling away rapidly.

The implications here are enormous. The educational requirements of the labor market keep escalating. The competition for the high quality, educated female is growing and is likely to become even more fierce. But the rapid entry of women into the labor market—and into the Army—can create divisiveness.

Whenever the value of female service is examined, certain issues inevitably surface. The data below were provided by Dr. Naomi Verdugo of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Human Resources Directorate, Department of the Army. She was kind enough to share the results of studies she has either performed or collected that bear upon the issues surrounding women in the force.

- Pregnancy rates during deployments are the same as before deployment, according to two separate studies. However, pregnancy rates of soldiers are lower than for civilians the same age.
- On average, married service members have two children; female service members have fewer than males; dual-service couples have fewer children overall.
- The percentage of married enlisted men in the Army is almost 60 percent; married enlisted females are close to 50 percent. Of married enlisted females, 50 percent are in dual-service marriages, while only 7 percent of enlisted males are in dual-service marriages. For officers, 5 percent of males are in

dual-service marriages compared to 44 percent of married women officers.

- Although the percentages are close for enlisted single parents, males outnumber females as single parents because they represent a larger proportion of the force. Of males, 15 percent are single parents, while 20 percent of females are single parents. Among officers, 11 percent of males are single parents, while 10 percent of females are single parents.
- Women have a tougher time meeting weight standards. Age and childbearing only make it harder. At the rank of E-6 and below, men and women experience weight difficulty at similar rates. In the officer ranks and at the senior NCO level, women find it twice as tough.
- Females fail to deploy for child dependency reasons at a greater rate than males, but experience fewer losses for indiscipline, performance, criminal acts, and such.

Beyond youth market propensity for Army service, we attempt to track the attributes young people seek in their future lives. We use this information to refine our advertising strategies and recruiter presentations. The 1997 Youth Attitude Tracking Survey (YATS), which included approximately 10,000 military-aged youth 16-24, was based upon a 30-minute telephone survey started in 1975. Teenage Research Unlimited is a direct mail survey of a representative sample of approximately 2,000 teenagers aged 12-19. Responses were tracked to guide advertising and marketing efforts.

In general, the Army is becoming older, more ethnically diverse, more likely to be married, better educated, and more female. But merely identifying these changes doesn't really address the impacts we can expect to experience because of such shifts. It's easy to see that some liberalizing developments are to be expected, given the greater social

tolerances we achieve with each successive generation of youth. It is they, after all, who provide the ever-necessary turnover of first-term recruits. Some of the impacts may come about relatively soon—2030 may be too soon for some of the others.

Our society currently finds the prospect of female war casualties too repellent to purposely place them in positions that have a high combat probability. That sentiment in turn drives the combat exclusion policy, which influences the number of female positions available more than any other factor. And it is this sentiment that permits the perpetuation of traditions and myths about the military institution and women's proper role in it. The struggle against such traditions and myths was never about women seeking special privileges or double standards. It was about being allowed to compete based on ability instead of gender. It was never about proving that women can do anything a man can do, but about being judged as individuals by the same standards as men in any job for which they can qualify. It has always been about being allowed to pursue a career based on their individual qualifications rather than sex stereotypes and male norms unrelated to the job. It was never about women's equality to the exclusion of readiness considerations. It was about the privilege of serving one's country without artificial barriers based solely on gender.

The mission of the armed forces is to provide the best possible national defense within the funds allocated for that purpose. The goal of the military personnel systems must be to provide the right people to do the job. So the bottom line is that no individual, male or female, should be allowed or required to fill any job he or she cannot perform satisfactorily in war for whatever reason. Gender is rarely, if ever, the best criterion.

So the issue, really, is attitude and societal values. But what will it take for our society to accept the necessity of female service? Will the inability to recruit sufficient males cause us to reconsider or will we look to the draft, doing

away with the gains made in the past 25 years of the all-volunteer force? Are young men today so obliging that they will accept the inequality of a male-only draft policy? Can we sacrifice quality for the sake of our desire to shield our female population?

These are questions that can be addressed only by national developments yet unwritten, especially as they play upon American public opinion. We are more likely to have a female Commander in Chief before we have a female Chief of Staff of the Army.

CHAPTER 9

PERSON TO PERSON: THE DIVERSITY CHALLENGE FOR THE ARMY AFTER NEXT

Andre H. Sayles

INTRODUCTION

Organizations across America are today addressing issues related to living and working in a culturally diverse environment. For example, the Army is implementing what is known as the Consideration of Others Program. This effort was pioneered at the U.S. Military Academy during the early 1990s, and was subsequently adopted by the Military District of Washington. Moreover, diversity was a curricular theme for the U.S. Army War College Class of 1998. In this chapter, I hope to encourage readers to adopt a positive outlook on the value of diversity and reach an understanding of how we can build on that value to the benefit of both the individual and the Army.²

WHAT IS DIVERSITY?

The meaning of diversity depends upon both the person and the context. In any group of several individuals, we can expect diversity. Differences may be derived from an endless list of possibilities, including place of birth, social status, language, culture, height, weight, and age. All of us have taken part in discussions regarding how soldiers from the south may have a perspective different than soldiers from the north. At times, we even make generalizations about individuals from particular states or regions within states. The same is true when we compare life in a rural environment with life in the city. I mention these possibilities because I want to encourage an understanding

of the importance of differences in people. At the same time, I suggest that we are all novices when it comes to working with diversity issues. Accordingly, we need to do the best we can to focus on the primary differences that affect the workplace before addressing sources of diversity that have a lesser impact on our organization.

Judging from my experiences in the Army, we should be concerned about the primary differences in people based on ethnicity, gender, and religion. Ethnic diversity issues are often derived from cultural differences that can lead to misunderstandings. In contrast, racial differences are usually based on physical and biological characteristics. Although two people of different races can have a similar culture, we often associate minority races with a stereotypical ethnic minority culture. In theory, racial differences should not lead to misunderstandings unless cultural or some other differences are also present. However, minorities in the Army usually have a culture that differs from what I will call the dominant military culture. In cases where cultural differences between two people are insignificant, racial biases can still hinder the relationship. For convenience, I have lumped ethnicity and race together. If we can make significant progress in understanding the three general areas of ethnicity, gender, and religion, then a second order effect will be an increased appreciation of the many other possible differences in people.

When we talk about diversity, we are talking about relationships between individuals or between the individual and the institution, especially where the institution reflects the attitude of its leadership. Diversity concerns are often associated with a minority population, although diversity does not always imply minority. Minority issues are derived from the concerns of or about racial or ethnic minorities. Gender issues originate because of differences between men and women. Therefore, when we want to speak collectively about those who are most affected by gender and ethnic minority issues, we should refer to this

group as women and minorities. Although common ground exists between gender and ethnic issues, there are also some fundamental differences. If we intend to get to the core of gender issues, we want to avoid lumping women into the minority category. We have both minority women and majority women. Therefore, minority women have two overlapping sets of concerns. We should speak of women when we refer to gender concerns and minorities when we talk about ethnic minority issues. Currently, women and minorities in uniform make up approximately 46 percent of the Army and 52 percent of the Army NCO Corps.

THE SAME OR DIFFERENT?

Over the years, we have seen a number of approaches to building diverse environments. For example, some of us say that the best way to handle diversity is to treat everyone the same. During the past few months, I have heard several minority colleagues say that they just wanted to be treated the same as everyone else. Not too long ago, one of my favorite statements was that we do not have men or women soldiers, we just have soldiers—essentially implying that everyone should be looked upon as the same. Assimilation refers to the cultural absorption of a minority group into a larger body. This assimilation requires the minority group to abandon its culture in favor of the organizational culture. The success of assimilation depends on how well the minority group can adapt to and become the same as the main cultural group.

In some organizations we see an approach to diversity that focuses primarily on individual differences. In the private sector, this notion is frequently driven by economics because it may be more profitable to ask a Hispanic employee to sell the company's products in a Hispanic community than it would be to have a member of the majority population go to that location. Instead of considering everyone to be the same, women and minorities are frequently thought of as being different. It may make

good business sense to leverage differences and sponsor programs that will prepare organizations for the time when racial minorities will make up more than 50 percent of the work force. The success of an approach that focuses primarily on differences may depend on how well the organization can provide an environment in which women and minorities can be productive and continue to receive promotions.

I am convinced that the most effective way of encouraging diversity is to combine these two approaches and consider people to be the same—but different. We have to understand how people are the same and how they are different in order to successfully manage diversity. We must realize that our military culture has evolved over many years. To every soldier who signs up, the Army is already a work in progress with an established culture—a culture that we cannot expect to change quickly. It is up to the individual to make the adjustment to adequately conform to this dominant military culture. For some soldiers, the changes are comparatively minor. For women and minorities, however, the required adjustment is usually greater because of gender and ethnic differences.

If we recognize that a dominant military culture exists, then women and minorities will conform to that culture to a certain extent in order to be successful, but they will also differ from that culture. It is not adequate simply to treat women and minorities the same as everyone else. It is also not enough just to look upon them as being different. If we treat every person the same all the time, on the surface it would seem as though we could never make a mistake. However, the first problem would be that everyone is not the same. The second problem would be that the objective of our dealings with others should not be simply to avoid mistakes or to protect ourselves. Similarly, if we only see others as being different, our approach will create its own set of problems. We will fail to create the best possible environment if, for the sake of efficiency and good order and

discipline in our organization, we blindly insist that everyone is the same.

THE KEY TO SUCCESS

The concept of “same but different” will enable us to continue to build effective organizations as the impact of diversity becomes greater in the next century. We must develop a clear understanding of how we are the same and how we are different. We must complement that understanding with knowledge of when individuals should be treated the same and when they need to be treated differently. We need to understand our organizational culture and the extent to which we want those who are different to adapt to that culture. If we ask for 100 percent adaptation or assimilation, we are asking some individuals to give up all of their past. If we ask for no adaptation, then our organization has no culture of its own and it fails. This balance between the individual’s need to align with the organizational culture and the organization’s need to recognize individual differences leads to success in managing diversity. This balance of “same but different” creates an environment in which each of us can excel by working to our full potential.

WHY CONSIDERATION OF OTHERS?

Consideration can be defined as thoughtful regard for others. It may be possible to respect another person, but occasionally treat that person poorly. However, if we are considerate of others, we will consistently treat them with respect and dignity. Consideration requires full-time respect for others, regardless of our personal feelings towards them. When we adopt consideration of others as a way of life, we will see that it spans the full range of human interactions. We cannot treat others poorly because of differences attributed to gender, race, ethnicity, culture, and religion, or other factors such as alcohol use, hatred, medical limitations, or personal opinion—and

simultaneously be considerate of them. Consideration is a philosophy for dealing with others that is independent of circumstances or physical characteristics.

The ability to be considerate of others can be achieved through sensitivity training. The objective is a deeper understanding of others and oneself through an exchange of thoughts and expression of feelings. This understanding focuses mostly on how people are different. We can never achieve perfect sensitivity. The growth process must occur over many years. Sensitivity is like a curve that approaches a straight line or asymptote but never actually reaches that line. The farther the curve is from the asymptote, the greater our likelihood of being inconsiderate. As our sensitivity develops and we start to understand people better, we move along the curve and get closer to the asymptote. Eventually, we reach a point where our understanding of differences allows us to know both the meaning and the application of Consideration of Others. We will continue to make mistakes because we can never reach the asymptote, but our sensitivity will be elevated to the point that we will know when we have made a mistake, and we will understand that we must go back to the individual and "set things right" at the first opportunity. Without sensitivity training, we will make mistakes in how we treat people and not realize that we have been inconsiderate. Since we can never reach perfection, consideration-of-others training must be a continuous process over the duration of a career. Many years of working to understand others will bring us closer and closer to the elusive asymptote of perfection, though we can never actually reach it.

WE NEED TO COMMUNICATE

Understanding others can be achieved through a series of frank, face-to-face discussions. People fail to understand each other because they do not communicate with each other. They do not communicate with each other because

they are separated from one another. The Army's Consideration of Others Program brings soldiers together in small groups to facilitate communication and promote understanding. Eventually, we learn to speak different cultural languages. We understand how we are the same within the institutional culture and how we are different. Ultimately, we begin to understand how we must all subordinate our individual views for the benefit of the organization. We also begin to see when and how the organization should respect our differences. We learn how we each look upon ourselves as individuals, but also as part of an organization. We are beginning to achieve our goals when the institution looks back at us and sees the same picture. Through consideration of others, we are not directly changing the institutional culture. We are changing the way people in the organization behave. Over time, this changing behavior will have a positive impact on the institutional culture from the bottom up. Moreover, an increase of women and minority senior leadership could have a complementary effect from the top down.

GOLD OR PLATINUM?

As explained by Major General Robert F. Foley and Major Denise A. Goudreau in their article, "Consideration of Others," the Golden Rule is the essence of such consideration.³ We want to be able to treat others with respect and dignity just as we want them to treat us with the same respect and dignity. The Golden Rule comes from several places in the Bible, most importantly Matthew 7:12 and Luke 6:31. Similar maxims can be found in other religions in either positive or negative form (e.g., do not do to others what you would not want them to do to you). In Matthew, the Golden Rule is positive and can be stated as "So whatever you wish that men would do to you, do so to them. This is the law and the prophet."

The Golden Rule is a principle that we should establish for our own guidance in our interactions with others.

However, we must be careful of how we interpret the rule and, more importantly, how our subordinates view it. Treating others the way we want them to treat us is valid at the macroscopic level or as a general way of working with people. For example, it makes sense to interpret Matthew 7:12 as a mandate to treat others with kindness because we want others to treat us with kindness. It would be a mistake, however, for us to use our own culture or our own preferences as the sole basis for determining how we treat others. For example, a Christian wants to be treated like a Christian, but it would not be appropriate for a Christian to treat a Muslim like a Christian. Similarly, a man should not necessarily treat a woman the way a man wants to be treated. If we interpret the Golden Rule in this literal manner of treating others the way we want to be treated, the Consideration of Others Program will not necessarily change the way we approach diversity. We are born knowing how we want to be treated and do not need training to enable us to treat others as if they were like us. The literal interpretation of the Golden Rule obviously has some shortcomings.

FROM GOLD TO PLATINUM TO RAINBOW

Consideration of others is about understanding other people so that we can treat them accordingly. The Golden Rule should be interpreted as a mandate to "treat others as you would have them treat you if you were in their place."⁴ We can capture this interpretation in what I have heard others call the Platinum Rule, and what I recently began calling the Rainbow Rule. This clarification of the Golden Rule can be stated as follows: "Treat others the way they would have you treat them." My metaphor of the rainbow derives from the myth that a rainbow extends from a pot of gold. It is also interesting to note how the colors of the rainbow are joined together for a single purpose in the same band of refracted light, but with each color retaining its distinction or difference. This is exactly how we build effective diverse organizations. Individuals must join

together and be the same for the sake of the organization, while the organization respects individual differences and allows those differences to be visible.

The Rainbow Rule is a straightforward way of understanding the importance of consideration of others. If our objective is to "treat others the way they would have us treat them," then we must understand other people before we can know how they want to be treated. The Consideration of Others Program brings our soldiers together in small group settings so that they can begin to understand each other better. With this understanding, the soldiers are armed with the tools they need to start treating others the way they should to be treated or the way they want to be treated. Christians must understand Muslims in order to treat Muslims the way they want to be treated. Men must understand women, and majorities must understand ethnic minorities. Likewise, women must understand men and minorities must understand the majority population. In the latter case, women and minorities may have a head start because they are already working in a majority dominated culture and to an extent will understand that culture by default.⁵ Their understanding of the dominant culture is necessary for success of the organization and success of individuals within the organization.

FROM TODAY TO TOMORROW

The Consideration of Others Program is important in our efforts to create a better environment within today's Army. The program will be even more important in preparing the Army for the future. As America becomes more diverse, the Army will also become more diverse. By the year 2030, minorities in America will likely increase from the current 28 percent to approximately 40 percent of our national population. This minority population change will be largely due to the increasing proportion of Hispanics.

Women and minorities will play a major role in the Army of the future. Their combined population in the Army will

likely increase from the current 46 percent to well over 50 percent early in the next century. This implies that we need to learn more about diversity now so that our growth as an institution will not be inhibited by changing demographics. Today's efforts should encourage emergence of a future in which diversity is an effectiveness multiplier instead of a problem to be managed.

A GLIMPSE INTO THE FUTURE

The Army of the future will likely include small warfighting elements that combine in a variety of configurations, move quickly to anyplace in the world, and connect through vision and voice to any point on earth. The individual soldier may be outfitted in climate-controlled, individual armor with protective defense against chemical agents, small arms fires, and adverse environmental conditions. Global communications via satellite will complement regional communications based on wireless or cellular systems enhanced by unmanned aerial vehicles. At the touch of a button or perhaps in response to an inconspicuous mental or physical gesture, the head-worn display will provide the positions of enemy and friendly forces, targeting information, mission status, and environmental conditions. The individual weapon will be able to automatically identify and target the enemy. The land warrior will have no concerns about temporary environmental conditions such as day and night. Likewise, the ability to be extracted or resupplied at just the right time will be taken for granted.

Although none of us can predict the future, the point that I want to make about the Army After Next in this abbreviated scenario is that our forces will be integrated and fast-moving. In fact, we may not have a separate Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps in 2030. We may have a single service or perhaps two services. Regardless of the exact nature of the future force structure, it will demand total integration of personnel. Our effectiveness in 2030 will

depend on the extent to which men and women and people of color and whites are interchangeable. My use of interchangeable does not imply that women and minorities will be assimilated into a single culture. It means that all of our soldiers will understand each other and can make an immediate adjustment to accommodate the person at his or her side. Interchangeable also means that by 2030, women and men may perform the same job functions. In today's Army, that would imply that women would eventually be introduced into all branches. In a future scenario, the integrated environment may make little or no distinction between branches—if we have branches at all. Regardless, the pace of conflict in 2030 will dictate that soldiers be interchangeable. We will not have the time to stop a fast-moving operation and raise the heads-up display to check soldiers for gender, religion, or ethnicity before going into battle.

WE MUST MOVE FORWARD

If our “mark on the wall” for 2030 is total integration and interchangeability of service members, we need to look backwards from the Army After Next time period and ask what that means today. It means that we need to vigorously pursue consideration of others in hopes that all soldiers will have reached the necessary understanding of others by early in the next century. We must continue making available to women all Army opportunities. It is critical to the Army After Next that we move forward from our current posture on gender integrated training and fighting. If we retreat from gender integration initiatives, the second order effect throughout the Army will be an attitude that women are a problem. We are ill-prepared to deal with such a backlash. This negative attitude will not easily die. If we stop progress now, it will take years to get back to the point where we accept the critical role of women in the future. We cannot stop and re-start the integration process on the fly. When dealing with people, transitions take generations. The year 2030 is only 31 years away. If we look back 31 years

from today to 1968 and think about the progress we have made, it becomes obvious that integration is a slow process because for it affects the culture of an organization. We can reach our target in the next century only if we continue to seek out and implement new integration opportunities from this point forward.

EFFECTIVE DIVERSE ENVIRONMENT?

I have written about the need to build diverse environments by using the notion of "same but different." This concept accounts for the ways in which people are the same as well as those in which they are different. Organizations that expect individuals to totally assimilate by giving up their own culture will always operate at less than the optimum level. The same is true for an organization that only focuses on differences.

Women and minorities can and must adapt to the Army culture. Common ground is necessary in any organization. At the same time, leaders must understand that individuals need to nurture their differences. In his autobiography, General Colin Powell talked about the student environment at Fort Leavenworth as follows:

Nevertheless, we had made it this far up the ladder precisely because we had the ability to shift back into the white-dominated world on Monday morning. Leavenworth represented integration in the best sense of the word. Blacks could hang around with brothers in their free time, and no one gave it any more thought than the fact that West Pointers, tankers, or engineers went off by themselves. That was exactly the kind of integration we had been fighting for, to be permitted our blackness and also to be able to make it in a mostly white world.⁶

General Powell describes his Fort Leavenworth environment as a place where he assimilated for the good of the organization, but was allowed to be different. Of importance is the suggestion that others recognized the

need for black students to nurture their differences during off-duty time.⁷ This brings me to some specific examples of the "same but different" concept.

WE NEED ROLE MODELS

To a certain extent, all soldiers are the same. This means that men can mentor women and whites can mentor blacks, at least to the extent that they are the same. The mentorship that we can offer our subordinates will adequately provide for their needs, regardless of gender, ethnicity, or religion. On the other hand, a small part of a woman's mentorship needs often can be provided only by another woman. The same is true for minorities. However, the fact that a black soldier can get only the last 5 percent of his or her mentorship needs from another black soldier is no reason for a white soldier to avoid providing the first 95 percent of the mentorship. We all can and should seek to satisfy the mentorship needs of our fellow soldiers and subordinates, regardless of our differences.

A very important part of an effective diverse environment is ensuring that role models are available to all members of the organization. An organization that has women and minority members should have visible women and minority leadership at the highest levels. Our environment should inspire subordinates to work to their full potential and create opportunities for success as a reward for that hard work. Women and minorities will know for sure that they can achieve success through hard work only if they have seen it done by one of their own. They need to believe that they can be the same but different and still make it to the top. They need to know that they can be successful without abandoning all of their differences in order to fully emulate the dominant culture. Women and minority role models that go beyond tokenism in an organization prove that stories about glass ceilings and "good old boy" networks are not true. For the Army, these

women and minority role models ultimately need to be at all levels in all branches.

TOLERANCE PROMOTES UNDERSTANDING

Women and minorities nurture their differences by sharing experiences with those who have a common background. We should be supportive when women or minorities spend time together nurturing their differences as a break from many hours or days of being the same for the sake of the organization. These opportunities to nurture differences often give women and minorities the strength to do a better job of being the same when the time comes to do so. For example, when Hispanic soldiers are speaking Spanish after work, they are not conspiring against the organization. They are nurturing their differences as a break from spending the work day being the same. The identical principle applies to a group of women who have lunch or dinner together.

The Consideration of Others Program will eventually lead us to an understanding of such differences and the impact upon our organization. It will become clear why a black soldier in a stressful environment may want to share quarters with another black soldier for the sake of having a few minutes to nurture differences after duty. It has nothing to do with segregation, but everything to do with integration. We will understand how the soldier's preference fits in with mission requirements that may prevent such a living arrangement. We will understand how a woman's approach to communications may be different from a man's approach. We will understand how men can work side-by-side with women in a professional relationship without fear of sexual harassment claims. We will understand how majorities can work with minorities without fear of racial bias allegations. We will understand the adjustment that women and minorities must make in adapting to the Army culture. We will understand why some women and minorities have concerns about being left out of

social networks. We will understand how being ignored socially deprives women and minorities of an important opportunity to sell their competence. We will understand how some women and minorities feel that they must behave like white males in order to be successful. We will become comfortable with all soldiers because we will understand each other.

CONCLUSION

As leaders, we are asked to establish a long-term vision for our organization and to point our subordinates in the direction of that vision. A realistic projection for diversity in the Army is that we will need to achieve total integration early in the next century. Our approach to diversity should be based on the "same but different" concept. We will need to expect our service members to become the same within the organizational culture while the organization recognizes that individuals need to hold onto some of their differences.

I can see three levels to my suggested approach to building an effective, diverse environment. At the first level, the organization recognizes the need for people to be the same, while respecting their differences. At the second level, the organization uses programs like Consideration of Others to help members understand differences and learn to treat others the way they want to be treated. At the third level, the organization recognizes the value of differences and makes use of the alternative perspectives to create the best possible working environment.

For clarity, I will briefly outline these three levels. The first level is a decision to buy into the "same but different" concept. We must accept the argument that total assimilation will never lead to the best possible environment for our subordinates. If we ask our soldiers to completely give up who they are in order to become the same as our organizational culture, the backlash will eventually show itself in the form of discontent and frustration. At the same time, as leaders we must expect our subordinates to

take pride in the organization and adapt to its culture. At this level we simply want to recognize that there needs to be a balance between adaptation to the organizational culture and respect for individual differences.

After buying into the “same but different” concept, we can move to the second level by beginning to understand how we are different. Initially, we need to focus on the key differences of ethnicity, gender, and religion. An effective approach to understanding differences is already built into the Consideration of Others Program. Simply talking and listening in a small group setting will go a long way. We must keep in mind that our road to sensitivity is always under construction. We can never be perfect. As we work harder to understand differences, we will become comfortable with our daily interactions. We will understand how others want to be treated. We will begin to sense when others want to be treated the same and when they want us to respect their differences.

At the third level of diversity management, we will have accepted the “same but different” concept and have achieved a basic understanding of differences. Eventually, we will become comfortable with those who are of a different gender, ethnicity, or religion. Our reduced inhibitions will allow us to appreciate diversity. Those strange opinions and unorthodox approaches to problems that come with diversity will no longer be dismissed without discussion. Instead, they will be considered alongside traditional views. We will begin to value diversity and incorporate alternative approaches into our ways of doing business. We will be effectively managing diversity.

This approach to diversity applies to other organizations as well as the Army.⁸ We need to understand where we are headed, but know that we cannot get there in a day or a few years. Our goal is to build an integrated environment in which each person can work to his or her potential while knowing that accomplishments will be recognized and due promotion opportunities will be granted. Men, women,

majorities, and minorities will better understand each other and learn to work with each other to the extent that they become interchangeable. Simply stated, we will be able to treat others the way they should be treated.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 9

1. My thoughts on the topic of this chapter greatly benefitted from my year as a student at the U.S. Army War College, Class of 1998. I want to thank my classmate, Janice K. Rauker, for providing a helpful perspective on diversity issues throughout the year. I am also very grateful to classmates who revised early drafts of this chapter, and to classmate Ronald L. Miller, who helped with the translation of the Golden Rule. I have been particularly inspired by three College staff and faculty members: Colonel Thomas P. Watts, USA; Dr. Herbert Barber; and Ms. Jenny Silkett. Finally, I want to acknowledge the support of Dr. Cheryl Miller, Dr. Rita Nethersole, and Dr. Sandra Adell from outside the Army War College.

2. This chapter is a slightly edited version of my essay under the title *On Diversity*, previously published as Army Issue Paper No. 1 (1998) by the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College. My views on diversity are primarily based on personal observations. In that regard, I am more of an experimentalist than a theorist. Thus, I have not relied extensively on other sources.

3. Major General Robert F. Foley and Major Denise A. Goudreau, "Consideration of Others," *Military Review*, January-February 1996, pp. 25-28.

4. A discussion of the Golden Rule can be found in *The Interpreter's Bible*, New York: Abingdon Press, 1951, Vol. VII, pp. 329-330. The 12-volume set is available to most military chaplains.

5. The argument that women are more comfortable than men when in the position of leading a diverse organization can be supported by the notion that women must adjust to the dominant military culture in order to be successful. If the dominant organizational culture is derived from male leadership, then out of necessity women will understand men better than men understand women. It follows that women may be more comfortable when leading men than men may be when leading women. A similar argument may apply to majority/minority leadership.

6. General Colin Powell, with Joseph E. Persico, *My American Journey*, New York: Ballantine Books, 1995, p. 120.

7. At the risk of expressing an opinion that is subject to controversy, I want to share some thoughts on terminology. The black population in America continues to search for an identity. About 30 years ago we decided that we wanted to be called "black" after rejecting the given names of colored and Negro. "Afro-American" was also used for many years as an alternative to the use of black. Afro-American is sometimes thought of as a more distinguished or official designation because it was used by the Library of Congress and many other academic institutions that wanted to start new programs in black studies. This use of Afro-American still exists because there is no pressure to undergo the expense of change. A few years ago, "African-American" became popular. In theory, African-American implies descendants of Africa or, more specifically, descendants of African slaves. However, a small percentage of blacks do not necessarily consider themselves to be African-American because they are not descendants of slaves. The bottom line is that many blacks do not have a preference. Those who do have a preference usually would rather not be called Afro-American. Most new literature avoids this term as well. This means that it would be safe to avoid the use of Afro-American while using black and African-American on an interchangeable basis. Keep in mind that Army literature mostly reflects the use of African-American, and that black is a more global term that also includes those who are not Americans.

8. The "same but different" concept can be applied at many levels in many different organizations. In an international setting, we would like to see different nations treating each other with respect and dignity. Understanding differences is critical to that process since respect and dignity take on different meanings in different cultures. Our ability to shape the international environment and spread American values depends on our understanding of how other cultures are the same as the American culture and how they are different. Effective diversity programs in the Army will give our soldiers a better foundation for understanding how to operate in the international arena.

CHAPTER 10

CONCLUSION: APPROACHING THE ISSUES OF RECRUIT DIVERSITY

Lloyd J. Matthews

The military, ostensibly a practical bunch, spends more time peering into the future than any other branch of American government or society.

Stephen S. Rosenfeld¹

In the preceding chapters of this anthology, we have seen detailed discussions of projected population diversity and its implications for recruit diversity, expressed in terms of considerable numerical and statistical quantification. We have also seen some suggestions of accompanying problems, along with approaches to solving them, within well-delineated compartments of the diversity phenomenon. But what this anthology offers, ultimately, is not a clairvoyant recital of every major problem that recruit diversity will surely present to Army planners in the near term, or even over the next 2-3 decades. Even more to the point, this anthology does not offer hard-wired solutions to such problems, since presently they remain potential and dimly realizable at this early juncture.

What this anthology seeks to do is make tentative, but reasonable extrapolations from current trends and analyze the results with disciplined imagination to discern whether difficulties are likely to surface. Through this effort we seek to identify developing or potential trouble spots and set in motion measures that avoid them, thus sparing ourselves disagreeable surprises late in the game.

Much has been made, for example, of the Army's recruiting shortfall in 1998 and the declining high school graduation rates and test scores of those recruited.²

Obviously such developments are of concern and must be addressed. For purposes of this book, however, we need to go further and inquire whether in such developments we are simply witnessing the fruits of traditional undulations in the American business cycle (which affects military recruiting through its influence on the availability of jobs), or whether we are witnessing instead some new development that could adversely affect recruiting well into the next century. It is precisely this longer-range perspective that Michael Stehlik takes in Chapter 6.

As part of a long-range analytical framework, it is important to ascertain whether particular problems are amenable to direct resolution by the Army itself, or whether the means for resolution lie beyond the Army's control, forcing the Army to adapt as an institution. With these considerations in mind, let us now review some of the main potential problem areas that may emerge over the next several decades and see how well they lend themselves to solution.

It was earlier suggested that ideally the ethnic groups in America should be represented within the Army in roughly the same proportions as in the general population.³ Such representation would cater to demands, in the name of fairness and equity, that each group shoulder its fair share of the nation's defense burden. But during the post-World War II era, we have never achieved such proportional representation, and achieving it will likely remain beyond the nation's reach for some time. As Linda Gorman and George Thomas have accurately pointed out, "The composition of a volunteer military will reflect that of the population only if all segments of the population have an equal interest in joining and an equal ability to meet the services' eligibility requirements."⁴ But neither of these conditions is satisfied in contemporary America. Since interest in joining the military often correlates with economic class—the poor being more prone to join the ranks and the comparatively well off being less so—and since whites have a higher median income, we find differences in

service inclination among ethnic groups paralleling income distribution.⁵

Nor is the ability to meet eligibility requirements, as reflected in standardized aptitude tests, equally distributed among ethnic groups.⁶ It thus becomes apparent that any successful effort to achieve something approximating proportionate ethnic representation in the Army during the all-volunteer milieu might require imposing quotas on overrepresented groups or lowering aptitude test standards for underrepresented groups. Since either of these measures appears unacceptable on its face, the goal of proportionate ethnic representation in the Army will remain elusive for the foreseeable future. In fact, given the correlation between economic success in the market place and enlistment, the Army may be lucky to achieve and maintain the high levels of educational attainment within its recruit base necessary to underwrite the technological, information-based force planned for the next century.

Of course, there are weapons to be brought to bear in the Army's campaign to recruit soldiers with sufficiently high educational achievement, but most of these require money, which in turn requires a cooperative Congress. We speak here of such measures as reinforcing the recruiting establishment, which would entail more recruiters and a larger advertising budget; of improved enlistment incentives, taking such forms as cash entry bonuses and educational benefits; and of such career incentives as increased reenlistment bonuses, military specialty bonuses, pay, and retirement benefits.

Recognizing the Army's present recruiting plight and its retention problems, Congress in late 1998 appropriated unusually large sums both to beef up the Army Recruiting Command and to provide positive incentives for America's youth to join the Army. For example, a \$3000 cash bonus will be paid to almost everyone who joins the Regular Army, regardless of Military Occupational Specialty chosen. The combined Montgomery GI Bill and Army College Fund

benefits have been raised from \$40,000 to \$50,000 for regulars.⁷ Even more dramatic, a congressionally appointed commission on service members' and veterans' transition assistance recently called for a fully government-funded 4-year college education for qualified recruits agreeing to serve a 4-year tour of active duty.⁸ The appeal of such a program would be nearly universal. Even middle and upper class families have increasing difficulty in sending their sons and daughters to college because of the soaring costs of higher education. An influx of enlistees from this source would go a long way toward solving the Army's needs in the technological era, but the program would be expensive—an estimated \$400 million the first year—and one cannot be optimistic about its prospects for passage. However, if the national recruiting environment ever degenerates to the point where the Army simply cannot man a satisfactory force, it may compel the nation to reexamine the concept of an all-volunteer force. Faced with the specter of having to reimpose conscription, Congress might find the idea of a free college education for 4-year enlistees a bargain after all.

In addition to recruiting and retention incentives to entice qualified young people to join, another tack would be for the Army to deliberately induct intelligent, but marginally unqualified recruits with the intention of providing remediation in basic education. In the case of recruits who need to improve English language fluency, the Army could administer basic instruction in English, either before or as an adjunct to basic recruit training. Such programs are expensive and inefficient, but if a true crisis in recruitment materializes, remedial programs are a means of salvaging high-potential youth who otherwise are overlooked by the recruiting market.

Finally, as so compellingly argued in Chapter 3 by John Groves, recruiting is facilitated when there are strong, affectionate bonds between the Army and the American people. It is an elementary necessity, no matter how much such efforts appear to divert the Army from its "true mission," for the institution to build bridges to the people it

serves and from whom it draws its sustenance and sinews. From providing bands and marching contingents at local patriotic events to cooperative interaction with industry and academe as embodied in the Army War College's Strategic Outreach Program, the Army needs to keep communications alive so that every citizen comes to know the soldier and feel he or she is part of their own. *Washington Post* writer Stephen Rosenfeld, on recently being invited to a seminar at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, expressed the view that might have been spoken by all Americans: "I like the military's reaching out to mix with civilians: It speaks of respect for an open society."⁹

We earlier noted that it is not likely that ethnic representation in the Army would ever match proportionally that of the population at large. But a far more important question raised in Chapter 1 is whether a roughly proportionate alignment can or should be achieved in frontline combat units. It is these soldiers who must close with the enemy, kill him, and occupy his ground. It is these soldiers who will inevitably take most of the casualties.

The automated, technologized combat soldier being designed for the Army After Next will require a far higher degree of technical trainability than he (or she) has in the past. Moreover, the requisite technical qualifications may rise even more for soldiers of other branches. Optimum allocation of technological trainability among all the competing branch constituencies will thus be a task for the modern-day Solomon: there will never be enough of the most intellectually gifted soldiers to satisfy every branch. The percentage of blacks in the infantry today—15 percent—already corresponds fairly well with the percentage in the U.S. population (12.2 percent).¹⁰ One way to expand sources of recruits with higher educational achievement would be to raise or eliminate female recruiting ceilings,¹¹ but this avenue bumps up against male-female ratios dictated by the prohibition against assigning women to units engaged in direct combat on the

ground. This prohibition derives from Department of Defense policy, not statute, thus it is presumably subject to change. Before that could happen, however, there must occur further change in the U.S. political climate. Though no one can predict the political winds of the future, Americans at the approach of the 21st century appear reasonably comfortable with the idea of expanding roles for women in the armed forces as a general principle, even nudging them into a few positions where they might be called upon to visit violence upon the enemy and suffer it in return.¹² But Americans appear determined to spare women the mortal embrace of tooth-to-tooth, nail-to-nail, breath-to-breath clashes with enemy warriors. Though some proponents of removing all gender-based combat exclusions sincerely believe that war of the future will be sanitized and bowdlerized, largely a matter of sitting at the computer and pushing buttons, Americans instinctively feel that war in its ultimate expressions will remain the nasty, brutish, masculine horror it was in the world of Homer, where fierce Achilles slew Hector on the bloody fields of Troy.

As we reflect over the preceding nine chapters, it becomes clear that this anthology, dealing as it does with the hazy future, raises far more questions than it answers. But this is all to the good, because by raising questions and sensitizing us to potential roadblocks that may lie along the road to our future Army. These chapters equip us to anticipate and deal with problems before they arise. Despite the contingent nature of much of the previous discussion, one premise embedded there remains clear, true, and unchallengeable: While today's Army will design and build the Army After Next, it is the individual men and women inhabiting that Army who will have to make it work. In deflecting our focus from the Army as an institution to the individual soldier, Andre Sayles in Chapter 9 makes clear that managing diversity in the Army is as much a people problem as a recruiting problem. If Army leaders fail to heed Sayles' eloquent plea to inculcate in the members of our force an understanding and acceptance of human

differences, then all our zealous recruiting, our vaunted technology, and our farseeing doctrine and force structure will ultimately come to naught.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 10

1. Stephen S. Rosenfeld, "Ready for the Last War," *Washington Post*, January 15, 1999, p. A29.

2. For typical recent statements of the problem, see Jane McHugh, "Coming Up Short," *Army Times*, November 9, 1998, p. 13; "Navy to Recruit More Non-Graduates," *The Sentinel* (Carlisle, PA), January 16, 1999, p. 3; and Dana Priest, "Services Combat Recruit Shortfall," *Washington Post*, February 17, 1999, pp. A1, A5. Whereas the high school graduation rate for recruits was 95.3% in FY 1996, it dropped to 90.6% in FY 1997 and 90.4 in FY 1998 (as of May 1, 1998). Accessions in the top two test categories totalled 38.8% in FY 1996, but dropped to 37.9 in FY 1997 and 36.1 in FY 1998. See United States Army Recruiting Command, "Accession Demographics (Includes Prior Service)," June 1, 1998, p. 1.

3. Chapter 1; see also David J. Armor, "Race and Gender in the U.S. Military," *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 23, No. 1, Fall 1996, pp. 21-22. To get a better perspective on the representation situation, compare the percentages below:

	U.S. Ethnic Proportions Today (Percent)*	Projected U.S. Ethnic Proportions 2050 (Percent)*	U.S. Army Ethnic Proportions for Enlisted (Percent)**	U.S. Army Ethnic Proportions for Recruits (Percent)***
White	72.1	52.8	56.7	62.8
Black	12.2	13.6	29.7	22.6
Hispanic	11.2	24.5	7.0	9.6

*Statistical Abstract of the United States 1997, 117th edition, U.S. Department of Commerce, October 1997, Table 19, p. 19.

**See "Army Demographics" (working draft), Headquarters, Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Human Resources Directorate, ATTN: SPC Gerry L. Green, Washington, DC, Demographic Profile As of April 6, 1998; Data As of September 17, 1997.

***United States Army Recruiting Command, "Accession Demographics (Includes Prior Service)," June 1, 1998, p. 1.

4. Linda Gorman and George W. Thomas, "General Intellectual Achievement, Enlistment Intentions, and Racial Representativeness in the U.S. Military," *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 19, No. 4, Summer 1993, pp. 611-624.

5. Gorman and Thomas provide an excellent analysis of the correlations among race, poverty, AFQT scores, and inclination for military service. See *ibid.*, particularly pp. 619-622.

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 612, 621.

7. Jane McHugh, "Recruits to Get More Money," *Army Times*, November 23, 1998, pp. 3, 13.

8. Bill McAllister, "Expanded Benefits Urged for Veterans," *Washington Post*, January 15, 1999, p. A27.

9. Rosenfeld, p. A29.

10. Charles Moskos and John Sibley Butler, "Racial Integration the Army Way," *ARMY Magazine*, July 1998, pp. 30-31. See also table in note 3.

12. Armor, pp. 24-25. The point is not that women are smarter than men, but rather that they would increase the available pool from which recruits with higher educational achievement could be chosen. Interestingly, of males entering the Army in 1998, 37% scored in the top two (of five) test score categories. Of females, 34.2% scored in the top two categories. See United States Army Recruiting Command, "Gender Accession Demographics (Includes Prior Service)," June 1, 1998, pp. 1, 3.

13. Jeanne M. Holm, "Women in the Armed Forces," in *Encyclopedia of the American Military*, Vol. III, ed. John E. Jessup and Louise B. Ketz, New York: Charles Scribner's, 1994, p. 1987.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES

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